JUDGMENT :

Dev Darshan Sud, J. (Oral)

1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of damages.

2. The brief facts are that the plaintiffs –respondents were the owners of a double storeyed building situated on a part of khasra No. 76 of village Ser, Tehsil Pachhad, District Sirmaur. The appellant-defendant was a tenant in the ground floor of the building having occupied it as such in the year 1992. On the night intervening 5th and 6th September, 1996 a fire broke out in the ground floor resulting in the destruction of the entire building. The plaintiffs have pleaded that the ground floor had been rented out to the defendant where the defendant had stored large quantities of resin. No proper safety measures had been adopted by them resulting in the fire going out of control destroying the entire building.

3. Defendant appellant admitted the tenancy and that resin was stored in the ground floor. It was pleaded that proper precautions against fire had been taken by them for which purpose, a chowkidar had also been employed for guarding the building etc. A specific defence was taken to the effect that the building was set on fire by one Prem Singh who was inimical towards the plaintiffs. A criminal case had also been registered against this person.

4. After a detailed consideration of evidence on record, the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed in the sum of Rs.1,56,105/- alongwith interest @ 6% per annum from the date of suit till payment.

5. It must be noticed that during the trial, the fact regarding creation of tenancy, stocking of resin tins and the building catching fire were not disputed. At this juncture, it must be noticed that resin is highly inflammable. It is by now well settled that damage caused for storing explosives and dangerous substances is actionable perse. The rule of strict liability as followed for decades, laid down in Ryland versus Fletcher is no longer applicable in India. (See M.C. Mehta and another v. Union of India and others AIR 1987 SC 1086). It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

“(31) We must also deal with one other question which was seriously debated before us and that question is as to what is the measure of liability of an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 (19) LT 220) apply or is there any other principle on which the liability can be determined. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was evolved in the year 1866 (1868?) and it provides that a person who for his own purpose brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person's willful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence. This rule laid down a principle of liability that if a person who brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. Of course, this rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority. Vide Halsbury Laws of England, Vol. 45 para 1305. Considerable case law has developed in England as to what is natural and what is non-natural use of land and what are precisely the circumstances in which this rule may be displaced. But it is