JUDGMENT :

V.K.GUPTA, J.

1. On 3rd August, 2007, CMP No. 1908 of 2006 was dismissed by this Court. The following order was passed:-

“The application is time barred. No prayer for condonation of delay has also been made. The application is dismissed.”

2. CMP No. 1908 of 2006 was an application filed by writ petitioner for substitution of the LRs of deceased respondent No.1 who as per the averment contained in para 2 of that application had died on 12th March, 2005. The said application for substitution was filed on 28th November, 2006 i.e. more than one and a half years after the death of respondent No.1. As the order dated 3rd August, 2007 clearly spells out, CMP No. 1908 of 2006 was dismissed as being time barred because no prayer for condonation of delay was made in that application.

3. In the present application, the same relief has now been sought and once again the writ petitioner has not bothered to explain the delay in filing the new application for substitution. Actually, the writ petitioner has made an incorrect statement in the course of this application by averring that CMP No. 1908 of 2006 was dismissed by this Court on 3rd August, 2007 without assigning any reason for such dismissal. This statement is palpably incorrect because the order dated 3rd August, 2007 clearly spells out that it was dismissed as being time barred.

4. Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, learned counsel appearing for petitioner has drawn my attention to a Full Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ram Kala and ors. vs. The Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Rohtak and ors. reported in AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 87. He submits and contends that the ratio in the aforesaid judgment lays down that provisions of law contained in Order 22 CPC are not applicable to proceedings initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court does not act as a Court of civil jurisdiction. Since according to Mr. Sood, the aforesaid judgment lays down that the provisions contained under Order 22 CPC are not applicable, therefore, according to him, the rigor of limitation attached therewith should also not be construed as applicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Without dis-agreeing in principle with the aforesaid proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, I do wish to hold that even though strictly the provisions of law contained in Order 22 CPC may not be attracted or held applicable in the writ proceedings because the High Court does indeed not act as a Court of civil jurisdiction while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, nonetheless the principles of substitution of legal representatives as enshrined in Order 22 CPC have to be invoked, followed and applied to the writ proceedings also because if in a Writ Petition one of the respondents dies, and if the writ petitioner thinks that the right to sue survives, it is his duty to apply for substitution of the LRs of the deceased respondent. Such an application for substitution has to be governed by some basic and elementary principles of law and for regulating such principles, the spirit as well as the scheme under Order 22 CPC has to be taken into account.

5. This apart, by now it is a well settled proposition of law that delay and latches in and with respect to writ proceedings can prove fatal and, therefore, whenever there is a delay or latches in writ proceedings or with respect to any matter connected therewith, it is the duty of the writ petitioner or the applicant therein to explain delay and latches. In the present case, unfortunately, the writ petitioner did not bother to render any explanation as to why it did not apply for substitution of the LRs of deceased respondent No.1 for such a long time.

6. For the aforesaid reasons, the application is rejected.