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1994 Supreme(J&K) 34

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
S.M. Rizvi,B.A. Khan,A.M. Mir, JJ.
Megha Enterprises And Etc. - Appellant
Versus
State & Ors. - Respondent
CIMA No. 15 to 17 And 19/1990 And LPA (C) No. 4/1990
Decided On : 30 March, 1994

Advocates Appeared:
Advocate For Appellant: R.P. Bakshi
Advocate For Appellant: J.S. Kotwal
Advocate For Respondent: Bilal Nazki
Advocate For Respondent: R.C. Gandhi

What is the ambit and scope of Article 181 of the J&K Limitation Act? Does it prescribe limitation for all types of applications under all special enactments including applications under Sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act or for applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only.

These questions arise out of the applications filed by the appellants under Sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act seeking reference of some disputes to the arbitrator. The applications were resisted by the respondent-State on the plea of limitation and eventually rejected by the learned Single Judge as time barred vide judgment dated 29. 12. 1989. The matter went in appeal to the Division Bench, which has referred the following question "for authoritative pronouncement by the Full Bench:

"Whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act is applicable to applications filed under Sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act? "

Before we proceed to formulate our answer, we deem it appropriate to bring out the close similarity between the State Act of 1938 and the Central Act of 1908. One is the true copy of the other. Their preamble is identical and they™re other provisions similar. The preamble of both the Acts reads thus:

" Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications to courts; and

The same holds true about Sec. 3, which provides that every suit and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefore in the first schedule, shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The first schedule in both comprises of three Divisions. The first Division deals with suits, the second with Appeals and the third with Applications. The third Division comprises of Articles 158 to 183. Article 181 figures in this Division and stands thus:

"Description of applicationPeriod of LimitationTimes from which period begin to run
181. Applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure".Three yearsWhen the right to apply accrues
Article 181 of the Central Act has received considerable attention by the courts over a period of time. Therefore, it has a mass of precedent behind it and we have a lot to draw from. To that extent we are not traversing any virgin field and it becomes rather easy to approach the issue in the context of the meaning already attached to the provision by a long line of judgments. We deem it proper to refer to these judgments first for better appreciation of the controversy and for proper construction to be placed on Article 181.

Article 181 of the Central Act fell for consideration first time in Macek Bais case (ILR 7 Bombay 213) wherein the Court ruled that Article 181 was limited to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) only. Westropp CJ., after referring to the corresponding Article 178 in the Limitation Act of 1877, observed :

An examination of all other Articles in the second schedule "relating to applications" that is to say, of the third Division of that schedule, shows that the applications therein contemplated are such as are made under the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence it is natural to conclude that applications referred to in Article 178 are application ejusdem geceris i.e., applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The preamble of the Act purports to deal with "certain applications" only and not with all applications."

Two reasons were advanced by the learned Judge in support of the view viz. (i) that since applications referred to in the 3rd Division of the schedule happened to be applications under the CPC, the word "applications" in Article 178 (corresponding to Article 181 of the 1908 Central Act and the State Act) should be considered ejustem generis; and (ii) because the preamble of the Act dealt with "certain applications" and not with all types of applications. This was followed by decisions of the Privy Council in Ram Duttas case (AIR 1929 P.C.103) and H































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