1. This is a revision petition against the order of the Munsiff Karnah dated 28-2-1975 recording compromise on the basis of which the court proceeded to pass the decree in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners.

2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the order is appealable under Order 43 R.l(m), therefore the revision is in competent. It is argued that, the order recording compromise is appealable notwithstanding the fact that the court has passed decree consequent upon it. Reliance is placed on A. I. R. 1954 J & K 54.

3. This objection is met by the learned counsel for the petitioner by enunciating the view that no appeal lies against the consent decree. In the present case as the decree has followed the order recording compromise therefore it being a consent decree is not appealable in terms of Section 96 of C. P. C.

4. I am, however, unable to accede to this argument. The petitioner has in unequivocal terms claimed the setting aside of the order of the trial court recording the compromise. This is evident from the prayer column of the revision petition. In other words the revision is not against the consent decree but against the order of recording compromise consequent upon which the decree has been drawn. It is therefore clear that the order sought to be revised falls within the purview of Order 43 R. 1(M) A Division Bench of this court in a case reported in A.IR. 1954 J&K 54 has had occasion to consider this question. It ruled that an order under Rule 3 of Order 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement, a compromise or satisfaction is appealable under Order 43 R. 1 (m) irrespective of the consideration whether the decree that followed it was a consent decree or not. The restriction that consent of the parties takes away the right of appeal does not attach to the order. I, therefore, hold that the order is appealable and the revision is not, therefore, competent.

5. On merits as well I find that there is no force in the revision in-as-much as the decree is in favour of the plaintiff petitioner. It is only the party aggrieved that can file an appeal or revision. The decree or order being in favour of the petitioner. He has no cause to come in revision. It is, of course, a different matter that the decree has proceeded upon the compromise which according to the learned counsel is not based on lawful agreement because the instrument of sale offends some law for the time being in force. In my opinion as the decree is in favour of the plaintiffs they cannot challenge or call in question the decree or the validity of compromise upon which the decree has proceeded. Nor can the petitioners be heard to say that their attorney who was also a party to the suit has played fraud against them. If the petitioners feel that the compromise offends any provision of law or that their attorney has played fraud against them, they may choose some other remedy available to them under the law. In this revision petition which is otherwise incompetent such questions cannot be decided.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, sought to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction vested in this court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India corresponding to Sec. 104 of the State Constitution. But that power is only a supervisory power. There is no formal motion of the petitioner to this effect. This request cannot, therefore, be acceded to. Moreover it is doubtful if the exercise of supervisory power can resolve the controversy raised by the petitioners.

7. For the foregoing reasons I dismiss the revision petition however leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

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