(1) These three revisions petitions raise a common question of law as regards the interpretation of Section 435 (a) (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by Act. No. XXXVII of 1978.

(2) In Criminal revision No. 28 of 1979, Brij Lal Chakoo Versus Abdul Ahad Nishati, the court of the City Magistrate Srinagar, has initiated proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. in respect of one single storeyed house with attic and land measuring six kanals appurtenant thereto situate at Gupt Ganga, Nishat Srinagar, and after drawing up the preliminary order as envisaged by Section 145 (1) of Cr. P. C. has also proceeded to attach the subject matter of the dispute under proviso to section 145 (4) Cr. P. C. In the revision before us the petitioner has challenged the legality of the order of the Magistrate both under Section 145 (1) and proviso to Section 145 (4) Cr. P. C. In the other two cases namely revision Nos. 34 and 41 of 1979, viz Rehman Malik and ors Versus Gh. Nabi Mir and Ahad Sheikh Versus Mehda Sheikh and ors, the courts of the Tehsildar Executive Magistrate Ganderbal and the Tehsildar Executive Magistrate Sonawari, respectively have attached the properties under proviso to Section 145 (4) Cr. P. C.

(3) When the aforesaid revision petitions came to be heard by one of us, a preliminary objection was raised that the revisions were not competent in view of the provisions of section 435 (a)(4) which barred the jurisdiction of revisional courts to entertain a revision against an interlocutory order. It was debated that the order made under Section 145 (1) and also under proviso to Section 145(4) Cr. P. C. are merely interlocutory orders and not final orders, and therefore, no revision was maintainable under section 435 (a)(4) Cr. P. C. In view of the importance of the question raised, which was likely to arise in a number of cases, the cases are referred to the Full Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. Accordingly these cases have been placed before us.

(4) We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.

(5) It would be advantageous to reproduce Section 435(a)(4) of the Cr. P. C. as amended :

"4 (a). The powers of revision conferred by this Section shall not be exercised in relation to interlocutory order passed in appeal, enquiry, trial, or other proceeding."

(6) The scheme of the above mentioned rule of procedure is to eliminate laws delays. The Legislative policy behind the amendment of the section is to accelerate the disposal of the criminal cases in the courts. It is with this intention that Section 435(a)(4) Cr. P. C. has been engrafted in the code. Experience has shown that in many cases parties resort to revision against mere interlocutory orders which are even of administrative nature and thus delay the disposal of the cases. Legislature has, therefore, in its wisdom barred the jurisdiction of the revisional courts to entertain revisions against mere interlocutory orders.

(7) The moot question for consideration is as to what is an interlocutory order. The expression interlocutory order" cannot an order which is not final. But it cannot be said that every interlocutory order is opposite to final order. May be that in interlocutory order decides the rights of the parties even though it is passed at an intermediary stage of the proceedings. It may be an order that is passed at the moment and may affect the rights of the parties in the proceedings. Such an order cannot be said to be merely interlocutory. The expression "interlocutory order" has been the subject of interpretation before some of the Indian High Courts as also the Supreme Court of India.

(8) In Shri Nageshwar Prasad Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and ors., reported in 1971 Cr. Law Journal, NOC 57 (Pat), the term "interlocutory order" has been understood to mean an order made during the progress of a proceeding upon some incidental matter arising out of the proceeding. Obviously it is not an order finally determining the right of the par

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