This is a revision petition. The petitioners are four of the persons against whom a preliminary inquiry is being held at Jammu by the committing Magistrate in respect of offences punishable under S. 121-A, 120-B of the Ranbir P. C. read with rule 32 of the Jammu and Kashmir Security Rules and the said rule 32. The petitioners claimed before the committing Magistrate that the inquiry has to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1956 hereinafter referred to as Act XLII of 1956. This Act purported to make several amendments to the Criminal P. C. of 1989.

One of the important amendments relates to the insertion of a new Section, 207-A, in the Code of 1989. But the important point to note is that the new Section, 207-A, enacted by Act XLII of 1956 would have application only if Act XLII of 1956 is in force. The committing Magistrate by his order dated 7th February 1959 held that Act XLII of 1956 is not in force in the State. Sub-s. (2) of S. 1 of that Act provides:-

"It shall come into force on such date as the Government may by Notification in the Government Gazette, appoint."

It is common ground that no such Notification has yet been issued by the Government. The Magistrate therefore held that none of the provisions embodied in Act XLII of 1956 is in force and that, therefore, the accused persons cannot claim to be governed by those provisions. The argument advanced by the petitioners that sub-s. (2) of S. 1 of Act XLII of 1956 was void as repugnant to S. 31 (3) of the Constitution Act of 1996 was repelled (2) the Magistrate. The result was that the Magistrate held that the Criminal P. C. of 1989 in its original form, that is to say without being amended by Act XLII of 1956. was in force and governed the preliminary inquiry. The petitioners preferred a revision to the Sessions Judge at Jammu who by order dated 28th February 1959 dismissed it. The petitioners have now come up in revision against the order of the Sessions Judge.

(2) The first question that falls for determination is whether Act XLII of 1956 is in force. If we are to go by the provisions of S. 1(2) of that Act we have perforce to hold that the Act is not in force because no date for its coming into force has yet been anointed by the Government as required by S. 1(2). But the matter does not rest there. Afzal Beg one of the petitioners who argued the case for himself and the other petitioners, has strenuously contended that sub-s. (2) of Sec. I of Act XLII of 1956 is void, being violative of the mandatory provisions of sub-S. (3) of S. 31 of the Constitution Act of 1996.

We have, therefore, to examine the validity of this contention. The argument of the petitioners is this: the expression "shall have the force of law" occurring in S. 31 (3) of the Constitution Act has the same meaning as the words shall come into force." So interpreted, S. 31 (3) of the Constitution Act embodies a restriction on the power of the legislature to appoint a date of its own choice for coming into force of an Act passed by it. This limitation forbids also the power of the legislature to make what is commonly known as conditional legislation, a typical example of which is S. 1(2) of Act XLII of 1956.

When S. 31 (3) of the Constitution Act has expressly enjoined that a Bill which is assented to by the Sadar-i-Riyasat and published in the Government Gazette shall come into force, the State legislature which has to function within the limits and under the limitations imposed by the Constitution Act, cannot postpone the date of, the coming into force of the law.

(3) Let us now examine each step of this argument. The first link in the chain of reasoning forged by the petitioners is that, the words "shall have the force of law" in S. 31 (3) of the Constitution Act have precisely the same meaning as the expression "shall come into force." Giving the words of S. 31(3) their plain grammatical meaning, we find it difficult to accede t