This revision arises out of an application under O. 1 R. 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit was for partition and separate possession of certain land and for ancillary reliefs. The plaintiff based his claim as a collateral of deceased Hatu to whom the land originally belonged. The defendants in the suit are the other collaterals of deceased Hatu. The plaintiff as well as the defendants proceeded on the common basis that Hatu died without leaving behind him a widow or lineal descendants. The defendants resisted the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that he was one of the reversioners entitled to claim a share in the property of deceased Hatu. Alternatively, they pleaded that even if the plaintiff is a reversioner, his right became extinguished on account of ouster and adverse possession by them.

(2) After the trial of the suit had progressed to its final stage, the petitioner, Mst. Bindro. came forward with an application under O. 1. R. 10(2) asking to be impleaded as a party defendant to the suit on the ground that she is the widow of deceased Hatu. If she is the widow of deceased Hatu as alleged by her, neither the plaintiff nor the defendants in the suit would have any right whatever to the property of deceased Hatu, as his reversioners. In view of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act Mst. Bindro may be able to claim that she has become the absolute owner of the entire property left by Hatu.

(3) The application of Mst. Bindro was resisted by the plaintiff. The trial court upheld the objection of the plaintiff and rejected the application. Mst. Bindro has come up in revision to this court against the order of the trial court.

(4) It is not claimed on behalf of the petitioner that she is a necessary party to the suit in the sense that the suit cannot be effectively disposed of without her presence on the record. She does not come within the purview of the words "ought to have been joined" occurring in sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of O. 1. But it is contended on her behalf that her presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit."

(5) The respondent-plaintiff urges that the mere circumstance that the plaintiff does not consent to the impleading of the petitioner is sufficient ground and justification for rejecting her application. The respondents learned counsel has relied upon Vaithilinga v. Sadasiva lyer, AIR 1926 Mad 836 for this proposition. No doubt, this decision seems to support the respondents stand. But one cannot fail to notice that the view taken in this decision is much too restricted and narrow to give full play and effect to the somewhat wide provisions of O. 1, R. 10(2),. This decision is in direct conflict with a later decision of the Madras High Court reported in the Secy, of State v. Murugesa Mudaliar, AIR 1929 Mad 443.

An earlier decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Sir Charles Turner C. J. and Muthuswami Ayyar J. reported in Vydia-naua v. Sitarama, ILR 5 Mad 52 is also in direct conflict with the decision in AIR 1926 Mad 836. In Vanjiappa v. Annamalai, AIR 1940 Mad 69, the decision in AIR 1929 Mad 443 was expressly followed. It is unnecessary to notice the several other decisions of the Madras High Court which have adopted the broader view expressed in AIR 1929 Mad 443.

(6) The two trends of judicial opinion noticed above appears to exist in England also. The Supreme Court in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 has in its majority judgment referred to the two currents of judicial opinion obtaining in India as well as in England.

(7) It appears to me that to make the addition ;of a party defendant to a pending suit under the second part of sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of O. 1, Civil P. C. depends entirely on the consent of the plaintiff will defeat the very object of that rule. To say that even if a court is satisfied that the addition of a new party is

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