This is a second appeal against the judgment of the Addl. District Judge Jammu who reversed the decision of the Munsiff, Jammu granting an injunction in favour of the appellant.

(2) The appellant instituted a suit in the Munsiffs court asking for a permanent injunction to restrain the Jammu Cantonment Board from evicting him from a land in which he claimed a lease hold interest. The respondent-defendant contended that the transaction was only a license and not a lease and that the license having terminated, the licensee is not entitled to any injunction against the licensor. The trial court found that the plaintiff was only a licensee; it, however, granted a temporary injunction in his favour to inure till the defendant-licensor obtained a decree in ejectment from a competent court. On appeal by the Cantonment Board, the Addl. District Judge dismissed the suit not on the ground that the true nature of the transaction between the parties did not admit of the relief asked for but on the main ground that the suit ought to have been instituted against the Government of India in view of Rule 43 (iii) of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules. The plaintiff has now come up in second appeal.

(3) The first contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant is that rule 43(iii) of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules has no application to the case. That rule is as under:-

"Suits affecting proprietary rights in land shall be brought by or against the Central Government and not by or against the Board. "

It is rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen did not in any way call in question or seek to affect the proprietary rights in the land concerned. The plaintiff did not question the right, title or interest of the Government of India or even of the Cantonment Board to the land. His claim was that under an agreement validly entered into by him with the Cantonment Board he was entitled to certain rights which were sought to be interfered with by the respondent. He claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant-respondent from such wrongful interference. He did not challenge or plead in derogation of the rights of the proprietor of the land. His claim was based exclusively on his rights under the agreement which was admittedly valid and binding on the parties.

(4) The learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to meet this contention. He felt himself constrained to agree that the scope of the litigation was confined to a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties under a valid agreement entered into between them. It does not, therefore, appear that the learned Addl. District Judge was right in holding that the suit was hit by rule 43(iii).

(5) But this is not sufficient for a decision on the appeal. Other important grounds had been taken by the Cantonment Board in the Memorandum of Appeal presented to the lower court. These grounds relate to the true nature and character of the transaction between the parties and their mutual rights and obligations there under.

(6) The appellant has urged before me that the transaction is one of lease and not of license. This makes it necessary to examine briefly the chief distinction between a lease and a license. S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. S. 52 of the Easements Act defines a license thus:-

"Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license."

I It is clear that a mere license does not create any estate or interest in the property to which it relates; it onl

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