This is a defendants second appeal directed against the decision of the District Judge at Srinagar who reversed the judgment) and decree of the Munsiff, Srinagar. The suit in this appeal was instituted by the respondent for arrear of rent for three years on foot of a lease deed dated 6th Magh 2004. The main defence in the suit was that the property leased did not belong to the landlord and that the lease deed came to be executed on account of coercion to which the appellant tenant was subjected by the respondent landlord and his friends. The suit was first decreed by the trial Court. On appeal, the District Judge remanded it for fresh disposal by the trial Court after recording a finding on. the issue of estoppel under S. 116 of the Evidence Act.

The Court of first instance again dismissed the suit, holding that the lease deed in question was brought about by coercion. The landlord again appealed to the District. Judge who on 11-7-1959 called for a finding from the trial Court on the applicability of S. 11 of the Jammu and Kashmir Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 24 of 1956. On 13-8-1959 the Munsiff returned the finding that the Act applied to the case. The District Judge thereafter heard the appeal and decreed the suit on 4-2-60. This had led to the present second appeal.

(2) The main ground on which the lower appellate Court has based its decision is that the appellant tenant is estopped by virtue of the provisions of S. 116 of the Evidence Act, from denying the title of the landlord respondent. It is common ground that the tenant was not let into possession of the land by the landlord. The concurrent finding of fact of the Courts below is that the appellant had already been in actual possession of the land when he executed the lease in favour of the respondent. Both sides have rightly accepted this finding of fact as binding on them. But they have grounded certain legal arguments on this finding. The learned counsel for the tenant has urged that the provisions of S. 116 of the Evidence Act will apply only to a case where -the landlord has let the tenant into possession of the land in pursuance of the lease and not to a case where the tenant was already in possession. The counsel for the landlord has, on the other hand, pointed out that the question whether the tenant was actually let into possession or not has no bearing on the applicability of S. 116. This section, so far as it is relevant to the present case, reads:

"No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property." On a plain reading of this provision it is apparent that it does not embody any condition as to the tenant being let into possession of the property by the landlord. But it is argued that the words "at the beginning of the tenancy occurring in the section mean the beginning of the occupation of the land by the tenant. And "occupation of the land ,it is pointed out, must be in pursuance of the leasa granted by the landlord. I am unable to see any justification for construing the words "at the beginning of the tenancy" in the manner contended for by the appellants learned counsel. To my mind, these words clearly indicate the date on which a lease was concluded between a landlord and a tenant. To give these words any other meaning would be to depart from the well-established canons of construction of statutes and to import into the section words which are not there and to give the plain words of the section a strained and artificial meaning.

(3) No doubt, there is in English Case Law some authority for the view that a tenant is only estopped from denying his landlords title, if at the time when he took his lease he was not already in possession of the land. Some of the earlier decisions of the Indian Courts seem to have been influenced by the English Case Law, but the more re

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