1990 Supreme(J&K) 8
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
B.A. Khan, J.
Gh. Mohd. - Appellant
Versus
Rasoolan - Respondent
Cr. Reference No. 29/1990
Decided On : 19 February, 1990
Advocate For Appellant: Puneet Gupta
Advocate For Respondent: Nemo
Non-observance of the procedural requirements of Sections 73 and 74 Cr.P.C. does not automatically vitiate an exparte order, and the limitation period for setting aside an exparte order under Section 488(6) Cr.P.C. is three months from the date of the order, not from the date of knowledge.
Headnote:
MAINTENANCE - SECTION 488 CR.P.C. - SECTION 73 AND 74 CR.P.C. - EXPARTE ORDER - SETTING ASIDE - PROCEDURE - LIMITATION - SECTION 488(6) CR.P.C. - INTERPRETATION - DELAYING TACTICS BY HUSBANDS - SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE - FAIR-PLAY - TECHNICALITIES - NEW OUTLOOK BY COURTS.
Fact of the Case:
The husband challenged an exparte order awarding maintenance to his wife under Section 488 Cr.P.C., arguing that the trial court had not followed the procedure laid down in Sections 73 and 74 Cr.P.C. while summoning him.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that non-observance of the procedural requirements of Sections 73 and 74 Cr.P.C. does not automatically vitiate an exparte order, especially when the trial court is satisfied that service was effected. The court also held that the limitation period for setting aside an exparte order under Section 488(6) Cr.P.C. is three months from the date of the order, and that knowledge of the order is not a relevant factor in determining the limitation period.
Issues: 1. Whether non-observance of the procedural requirements of Sections 73 and 74 Cr.P.C. automatically vitiates an exparte order? 2. Whether the limitation period for setting aside an exparte order under Section 488(6) Cr.P.C. is three months from the date of the order or from the date of knowledge of the order?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The purpose of Sections 73 and 74 Cr.P.C. is to effect service and compel the appearance of the accused/respondents. The form of summons and the agency through which it is served are not crucial as long as the person is informed about the cause against them. 2. The limitation period prescribed in Section 488(6) Cr.P.C. is absolute and cannot be extended by introducing the element of knowledge.
Final Decision: The court rejected the recommendation of the Sessions Judge to set aside the exparte order and upheld the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate awarding maintenance to the wife.
2. This is a reference made by the learned Session Judge Udhampur recommending setting aside of exparte order dated November 20,1989 passed by the trial court awarding maintenance allowance of Rs. 340/- per month to respondent petitioner. The reason advanced is that the trial court had not conformed to the procedure laid down in Sections 73 and 74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while summoning the petitioner-respondent.
3. From the record it appears that the respondent herein made an application invoking section 488 Cr. P. C. claiming maintenance. The matter was taken cognizance of by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udhampur on March 1,1981 and summons were issued against the petitioner herein. When repeated summons evoked no response, he was set exparte vide order dated August 20,1986. Thereafter, respondent-wife was allowed to adduce evidence in support of her claim culminating in exparte order dated November 7,1986 awarding compensation of Rs. 340/- per month to her.
4. The husband like all husbands of his class would not allow matters to rest at that and he filed an application before the trial court seeking setting aside of the exparte order passed on the ground that he had not been served and that he had come to know about the order impugned only during the execution proceedings. The learned C.J.M reacted his application by his order dated November 20, 1989 on the twin ground of his application being time-barred and also for his deliberate absence despite service.
5. Aggrieved by this he preferred a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Udhampur. That is how the reference recommending the setting aside of the order of the trial court dated November 20, 1989.
6. I have examined the two orders passed by the courts below and have also considered the record before ire. What is in issue is the mode of service. The learned Sessions Judge feels that since the mode and procedure prescribed in sections 73 and 74 Cr. P C, has not been foil wed order dated November 20,1989 cant be allowed to stand. What of respondent wife who goes packing to 1986 position and back to square one- Chapter VI of Cr. P. C. deals with, "Processes to compel appearance". Sections 68 to 74 provide for various modes and agencies for issue and service of summons in different eventualities. The spirit and purpose behind provisions failing under this chapter is to effect service and to compel appearance of accused/respondents. In what form the summons shall issue and through which agency is not of very crucial importance as against the factum of service. Whether the summons are issued in duplicate or triplicate, and through Magistrate, a police officer or a public servant is just a means. The end is whether these stand served and the concerned is informed about the existence of a cause against him.
7. The relevant provisions on which the learned Sessions Judge has placed reliance to invalidate order dated 20-11-1989 require to be appreciated in this perspective.
Section 73 reads as under:-
"When a court desires that a summons issued by it should be served at any place outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, it shall ordinarily send such summons in duplicate to the Magistrate within local limit of where jurisdiction the person summoned resides or is to be there served."
A bare perusal of the provision would show that it leave option open to the court to achieve the ultimate end of effecting service words "desires" and "ordinarily" are indicative of the legislative intent in this regard. By no norms of interpretation can it be suggested that a court has no way to reach a person living outside its jurisdiction limits, other than the one prescribed in the