IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
Mian Jalal-ud-Din, J.
Khurshid Ahmad & Ors. - Appellant
Versus
Mohd. Bashir Ahmad & Ors. - Respondent
Civil Revision No. 6-C/1970
Decided On : 15 April, 1971
SUCCESSION (PROPERTY PROTECTION) ACT, 1977 - SECTIONS 1, 3, 4, 18 - JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT JUDGE - CONDITIONS FOR ASSUMING JURISDICTION - RECORDING OF REASONS - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT AND TRANSFER TO CIVIL COURT WHERE REGULAR SUIT PENDING.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the District Judge to assume jurisdiction under the Succession (Property Protection) Act, 1977, alleging that the application filed by the respondents did not disclose facts giving jurisdiction to the court.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the District Judge had jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction under the Act, but that he should have recorded his reasons for believing that the conditions for assuming jurisdiction were met.
Issues: 1. Whether the District Judge had jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction under the Succession (Property Protection) Act, 1977. 2. Whether the District Judge had recorded his reasons for believing that the conditions for assuming jurisdiction were met.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The jurisdiction of the District Judge under the Act is founded upon his belief of the existence of certain conditions, including that the applicant is in possession of the property of the deceased and is threatened with dispossession by a person having no lawful title, and that the applicant is really entitled to the property and the application is made bona fide. 2. The District Judge must record his reasons for believing that the conditions for assuming jurisdiction are met.
Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition and directed the District Judge to stay his hands in the proceedings and send the entire case record to the Hon'ble Bench where the regular suit was pending.
2. On an application made by the present respondents under Sections 1 and 3 of the Act that Kh. Mohd. Maqbool the decreased had left huge movable and improperly and that the respondents were his heirs and that the present petitioners before this court were misappropriating the property changing its condition and intending to forcibly deprive the respondents from enjoying the fruits of inheritance, the learned District Judge after recording his satisfaction that there were strong grounds for proceeding and determining the rights summarily under the Act issued notices to the petitioners, and with a view to preserve the property from being misappropriated appointed a curator under Section 4 of the Act. The petitioners appeared before the District Judge and by means of a petition challenged the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the matter. The application was disposed of by the learned District Judge on 15-12-1969. The court rejected the request and it held that it had assumed jurisdiction after being satisfied of the existence of the circumstances and requirements envisaged under Section 3 of the Act. Aggrieved by these two orders the respondents in the main petition have come up in revision before this court.
3. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. S. L. Kaul counsel for the respondents in the revision petition that no revision is competent inasmuch as the Judge of the court of the District who has to take cognizance of an application under Section 1 of the Act is not sitting as the Presiding Officer of a civil court but he functions only as a persona designata. Where a person discharges his functions as persona designata his orders are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
4. In my opinion there is no merit in this contention because there is no warrant for the proposition enunciated that a Judge of the District while discharging his functions under Section 1 of the Act is only a persona designata and not the court. The expression "the Judge of the Court of District" used in Section 1 means that it is the District Judge who is to act and is empowered to assume jurisdiction for the purposes of this Act. Judge is defined in the Civil Procedure Code as the Presiding Officer of a Civil Court; no other connotation can be attached to this word. Moreover, S. 18 of the Act is clear. It provides that the decision of the Judge in these proceedings shall be final not subject to any appeal or review. It implies that the legislature did not intend to give right of appeal or of review to the aggrieved person. Were the Judge to act as a persona designata in these proceedings as the argument is then his order ipso facto would not be subject to an appeal or review and in that event there was no necessity for the legislature to have incorporated the provisions in Section 18 relating to appeal and review. A similar point arose for consideration in AIR 1938 Lah 753. The learned Judge decided the point by holding that although no appeal or review is allowed from at order in summary proceedings by a District Judge yet there is nothing in the section or the Act which takes away the right of revision by the High Court. By virtue of Section 141 of Civil Procedure Code the procedure is that the Code, in absence of a provision to the contrary, governs these proceedings. The learned Judge was unable to see as to why revision should not be competent under Section 115, C. P. C. A Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court in 66 Pun Re 1882 (FB) also came to the same conclusion. Moreover, the scheme of the Act shows that the Judge has to adjudicate upon the civil rights
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