Per Jaswant Singh C. J.

1. This reference by Honble Mufti Baha-ud-Din Farooqi, J. arises in the following circumstances: -

By order No. 36 of 1975 made by the District Magistrate Jammu, on February 7, 1975, in exercise of the power conferred on him by section 3(2) read with section 5 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the petitioner who is a citizen of India and a permanent resident of the State was ordered to be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on February 11, 1975, pursuant to the District Magistrates order of even date. On February 25, 1975, the petitioner filed before this court a petition under Art. 32 (2-A) of the Constitution of India read with section 103 of the State Constitution being petition No. 287 of 1975, challenging his detention contending inter alias that section 8(1) of the Act which vested a discretion in the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention to a detune within five days in the ordinary course and not later than fifteen days in exceptional circumstances from the date of detention was unconstitutional being violative of Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India On the petition coming up for hearing before Mufti Baha-ud-Din Farooqi, J. the learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the aforesaid contention raised in the petition to the effect that section 8(1) of the Act was hit by Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, that the point raised before him was of considerable importance and was not covered by any decision of the Supreme Court or of this Court, the learned Judge ordered the papers to be placed before- the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for determination of the vires of section 8(1) of the Act. This is how the petition is before us,

2. The case has been very ably argued by the learned counsel for the parties.

3. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner Mr. Sharma has advanced a very ingenious argument. He has submitted that the expression "as soon as may be" occurring in clause (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution of India have the same meaning as it has under clause (1) of that Article. Elaborating his contention the learned counsel has submitted that since a person arrested for the alleged contravention of a penal law has to be informed of the grounds of his arrest either at, that, very time or within a period of twenty-four hours of his arrest when he is produced before the nearest Magistrate, the communication of the grounds of detention to a retinue cannot also be delayed beyond twenty-four hours of his arrest and that section 8 of the Act which gives a discretion to the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention within five days in the ordinary course and within fifteen days in the abnormal course, as already stated, is unconstitutional being repugnant to clauses (1) and (2) of Art- 22 of the Constitution. He has further contended that since the founding fathers of the constitution provided in clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 22 that the grounds of arrest must be communicated to the person arrested for contravention of a penal law within twenty-four hours of his arrest, a different intention cannot be imputed to them in respect of an arrest made under a law relating to preventive detention. He has in support of his contention invited our attention to the following sentence occurring at page 276 in "the Interpretation of Statutes" by Sir Peter Senson Maxwell (English Edition): -

"It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act,"

4. Mr. Amarchand has, on the other hand, urged that subsection (1) of section 8 of the Act is perfectly valid and constitutional. He has submitted that the expression "as soon as may be" occurring in the aforesaid provision which is merely a

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