"Where a witness is confronted by his previous statement and is given opportunity to explain, that part of statement which is put to him does not constitute substantive evidence."

It will also be advantageous at this stage to refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Bareilly Electricity Supply Co, Ltd. Vs The Workmen and ors, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 330, where it was held that though the evidence Act is not applicable to the Domestic Tribunals that does not mean that where issues are seriously contested and have to be established and proved the requirements relating to proof can be dispensed with.

20. Bearing in mind the above noted principles, let me now see whether there was any legal evidence to justify the crucial conclusion arrived at by the Anti-Corruption Commission that the labourers engaged by the Public Works Department for the construction of Kaluchak Purmandal Road ‘had been made to work at the house of the appellant. A perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the Commission would make it clear that it has not been legally proved that the house on which the P.W.D. labourers were found working belonged to the appellant. No witness of the prosecution came forward and stated before the Commission that the house was actually of the appellant.

The evidence of Amrik Chand Gupta, Dy. S. P. on which reliance seems to have been placed is not at all helpful to the respondents as the Dy. S. P. had no personal knowledge of the matter and Rawal Singh P. W. 3 too, who accompanied him had not personal knowledge as to whom the house belonged. The knowledge of Rawal Singh was based on the statement of Bhajan Singh P. W. who himself was not clear about the ownership of the house. The latter-has stated that he told Rawal Singh and Shri Bal Mukund P. Ws that the house probably belonged to the appellant. He has also admitted that neither he nor Rawal Singh nor Bal Mukind nor any one also enquired on the spot from any one as to who was the owner of the house and that he did not see whether the appellant or any of his relations at the house Rawal Singh had also to admit that the Dy. S. P. did not enquire from any person of the locality whether the house where the labour was working was of the appellant or not. Mani Ram P.W. a Mate of P.W.D., who was declared hostile has categorically stated that he never went to the house of the appellant on October 23, 1967 i.e. the date in question with his labour nor made them work there. Bal Mukund P. W. 4 also admitted that he did not personally knew if the house belonged to the appellant. Shri Hans Raj P.W. also categorically stated that at the time of the raid by the police he was working at the house of Shri Tej Ram Mahajan in Gandhi Nagar and the police got his statement under pressure.

Purkh Singh P. W. who was declared hostile has stated that he did not know the house of appellant and had gone to work at the house of Tej Ram Mahajan. Although his attention was, with a view to contradicting him drawn to the previous statement alleged to have been made by him during the course of investigation before Amrik Chand Gupta, Dy. S.P. wherein he is said to have stated that the house was of the appellant, he interalia stated before the Commission that he told the police that the house was of Tej Ram Mahajan. Now as held in 1969 S.C. 983 and 1971 S.C. 2256 (Supra) where a witness is confronted with his previous statement and is given opportunity to explain, that part of statement which is put to him does not constitute substantive evidence. Thus the previous statement said to have been made by Purkh Singh before the Dy. S. P. could not be used by the Commission as a basis for holding that the house belonged to the appellant. Even assuming that the previous statement of Purkh Singh before the Dy. S. P. was made in presence of the appellant, that could not be enough to stamp the statement with a ring of truth and enable the Commission to rely on the same as the appellant had no occasion

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