1. These are three writ petitions and raise common questions of fact and law. This single judgment will, therefore, dispose of all these three writ petitions.

2. The petitioners have averred that their father purchased land in village Gangoo Chak by sale deed dated 20-4-1967. Respondent No. 3 brought a suit for possession of the said land on the basis of right of prior purchase against the petitioners in the Court of the District Judge, Jammu. It was later on transferred to the Court of the Munsiff, Jammu. After the notification under the Jammu and Kashmir Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1962, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was promulgated, the suit was transferred by the Munsiff to the Tehsildar, respondent No. 2 who passed decree for possession in favour of respondent No, 3. The suit was contested by the petitioners on the ground that respondent No. 3 had no right of prior purchase and that the sale was made with her knowledge and that she had waived the right. Against the judgment and decree of respondent No. 2, an appeal was preferred before the Settlement Officer, respondent No. 1 who dismissed the same on 31-12-1971. The impugned judgment of the Tehsildar as also of the appellate judgment of respondent No. 1 have been assailed by the petitioners on the ground that the Tehsildar the Consolidation Officer or for the matter of that respondent No. 1, the Settlement Officer, had no jurisdiction to decide the rights of the parties in a civil suit. The Act did not confer any such power on them, nor could respondent No. 2 try and decide the suit of a civil nature. The suit was of a civil nature and could only be decided and tried by a civil court. In this way, it is submitted, the petitioners have been deprived of their land otherwise than in due course of law and without the authority of law. The petitioner have, therefore, prayed that the court may issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the judgments and decrees of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and also issue a writ of prohibition restraining respondents from dispossessing the petitioners from the land in question.

3. Objections have not been filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent No. 3 has, however, filed the objections in which she has contested the claim of the petitioners to seek extraordinary remedy from this court by way of writ. It is averred by respondent No. 3 that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had full jurisdiction in the matter and the judgments and decrees passed in the proceedings before them do not suffer from any legal infirmity.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

5. Appearing for the petitioners, Mr. S. P. Gupta, has contended that the decision on a question relating to the right of prior purchase fell outside the purview of the Act as the Act did not authorise the Consolidation Officer to decide the rights of the parties in respect of the right of prior purchase. What section 5 (b) of the Act intends is that all proceedings for correction of records and all suits for declaration of rights and interest over land, both proprietary and tenancy pending before any authority or court are to be transferred to the Consolidation authorities for disposal and the said authority has to dispose of the proceedings under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. The argument is that it is only for the limited purpose of disposing of the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of this Act that suits are required to be transferred from civil courts to the Consolidation authorities. The Act nowhere gives power to the Consolidation Officer to decide the questions of title, proprietary rights or for the matter of that right of preemption. Learned counsel has elaborated his argument by enunciating the view that when a declaration under section 4 regarding consolidation is published in the Government Gazette, the only consequence that follow from the said notification is that the district or part thereof, as the case may be,

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