The interpretation of Sections 11, 12, and 14 of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, in relation to ejectment proceedings for default in payment of rent.

1. This civil second appeal, which should have been normally heard by a Single Judge, has been referred to this Bench, for reconsidering the correctness of a Single Bench judgment of this court in Dewan Chand Versus Davinder Kumar and others, 1971 K. L. J. 325. The reference has arisen in the following circumstances.

2. The appellant brought a suit for ejectment against the respondent under the provisions of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground of three defaults in payment of rent Within a period of 18 months, and annoyance caused by him to the appellant and to his neighbours. This suit was resisted by the respondent on the grounds: that he had neither committed any default in payment of rent, nor caused any annoyance to the appellant or to his neighbours, and further, that the notice for ejectment served upon him by the appellant was not in accordance with law.

3. The trial court, on the authority of the judgment given by this court in Dewan Chands case (Supra) dismissed the suit as premature, without recording its finding on the issues relating to annoyance and validity of the notice for ejectment. An appeal was taken by the appellant against this judgment, and the lower appellate court upheld the finding of the trial court on the concession of the learned counsel for the appellant that three successive defaults in payment of rent as alleged by the appellant in his plaint were not proved, but being of the view that even one default could entitle the appellant to obtain a decree for ejectment under Cl. (i) of Sec. 11 of the Act, over-set the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case back to it to decide it afresh keeping in view the effect of a single default in payment of rent, with a further direction to record its finding on the issues which it had previously left undecided.

4. The appellant, not being satisfied with the aforesaid judgment of the lower appellant court, challenged the same in this court in second appeal. The ground pertaining to annoyance was, however, given up by the learned counsel for the appellant by making a statement to that effect in this court. The learned Single Judge who initially heard the appeal by his order dated Dec: 13, 1973 remitted the same to the lower appellate court, with a direction to record its findings on the issues relating to three

successive defaults in payment Of rent and validity of the notice for ejectment the ground relating to annoyance having been already given up by the appellant and return the same to this court within one month, as in the opinion of the learned Judge, counsel for the appellant had in fact never made any concession on the issues of defaults, as had been recorded by the lower appellate court.

5. The lower appellate court, after sifting the evidence led by the parties, arrived at the conclusion that the deposit of rent which was made by the respondent after 20 days from the date of receipt of the notice, was not valid within the meaning of Sec: 14 of the Act, as the same had been made without first tendering the rent to the appellant landlord, himself assuming that the respondent had sufficient cause for not depositing the same with the Rent Controller within the statutory period of 15 days. It, however concurred with the finding of the trial court, and on the ratio of Dewan Chands case (Supra) hold that three successive defaults in payment of rent at the time of the institution of the suit did not stand proved. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate court also dismissed the respondents application for additional evidence to prove the factum of deposit of rent which was made to it after the order of remand dated. Dec: 13, 1973. It further held, that the notice of ejectment served upon the respondent was legally valid.

6. After this report of the lower appellate court was received in this court, this appeal again came up for hearing before Chief Justice S. M