1992 Supreme(J&K) 65
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
B.A. Khan, J.
Ganesh Dass Kudyal And Sons - Appellant
Versus
Chaman Lal Jain - Respondent
CIMA No. 83/1981
Decided On : 01 May, 1992
Advocate For Appellant: L.K. Sharma
Advocate For Respondent: V.R. Wazir
The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act, outlining the conditions for a second application for execution of a decree.
Headnote:
Limitation Act - Interpretation of Article 182 (5) - The court determined the fate of the decree-holder's second application for execution of a decree for recovery of Rs. 6,000, focusing on the interpretation of Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act. The key legal provisions discussed were the conditions for a second application, including steps in furtherance of execution, application in accordance with law, and application to the proper court.
Fact of the Case:
A decree was passed against the appellant for recovery of Rs. 6,000 in 1972. After a series of applications and dismissals, the appellant filed a second application for execution in 1981, which the judgment debtor resisted on the ground of being barred by time.
Finding of the Court:
The executing court held the second application to be within time, leading to the appeal. The court analyzed the interpretation of Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act and concluded that the second application was well within the period of limitation of three years, computed from the dismissal of the restoration application in 1978.
Issues: The contentious issue was whether the second application for execution was barred by time, revolving around the interpretation of Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was influenced by the interpretation of Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act, which outlined the conditions for a second application for execution, including steps in furtherance of execution, application in accordance with law, and application to the proper court.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, upheld the order of the executing court, and directed the executing court to proceed with the execution of the decree in accordance with the law.
2. A decree was passed by this court against the appellant for recovery of Rs.6,000/- way back on 25-5-1972. He filed his first execution application on 13-9-1977. This was, however, consigned to records on 27-12-1977. The decree-holder filed yet another application to have it restored, but that also was dismissed on 22-8-1978. Finally, followed the second application for execution which was filed on 2-2-1981. The judgment-debtor resisted it on the ground that it was barred by time. His plea, however, did not find favour and the executing court held it to be within time. Hence, this appeal.
3. Is the second application barred by time is the million-doller question. The answer to this turns on the interpretation of terms of Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act. Article 182 (I) provides for period of three years from the date of decree or order for making an application for execution. However, clause (5) of this Article lays down that period of limitation for execution of a decree or order of a civil court, not provided for under Article 183 or by section 48 of the code of civil procedure, is three years from the date of final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution or to take some steps in aid of execution of the decree or order. The relevant provision reads as under: -
"Three years...(where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) from the date of the final order passed on application made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution or to take same step in aid of the execution of the decree or order; or"
4. The aforesaid provision, as would be evident, provides for three years period of limitation from the date of the final order passed on an application, made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution or to take some steps in aid of execution of the decree or order. The necessary ingredients of this provision are as under: -
a) that steps taken should be in furtherance of execution of the decree;
b) that application taking the steps must be in accordance with law; and
c) that application must be made to the proper court.
5. If all these conditions exist, three years time is allowed for making a second application from the date of final order passed on the first application provided it is a step in aid of execution. Whether it is so or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and if the facts show that proceedings taken, in which final order has been passed, had the effect of facilitating or advancing the execution to any extent or removing some obstacle in the way of execution, it will be a step in aid of execution. Given regard to this legal position, it remains to be seen whether in the present case the application filed by decree-holder for restoration of his first application for execution was a proceeding which was a step in aid towards execution? If it could be so treated, the period of limitation of three years would run from the date final order was passed on the restoration application i.e. when it was dismissed on August, 22, 1978.
6. It should go without saying that application for restoration and revival of the previous proceedings for execution is a step in aid of execution within the meaning of clause (5) of Article 182 of the Act. The resultant proceedings, even if treated collateral are certainly a step in aid of execution. If that be so, which in fact it is, period of limitation is liable to be reckoned from the date of dismissal of restoration application. There is fortunately no controversy whether rest