1. Respondents sons of Javeed Rasol moved an application in the court of District Judge, Srinagar for possession of items of property specified in the application against their uncle Javeed Riyaz under Succession (Property Protection) Act, 1977, here-in-after for short "Act". The District Judge, Srinagar on the basis of material on record on the belief that the applicants prima facie, as successors to their father Javed Rasool, did have interest in the specified Mastrooka Property and in case they are left to ordinary course of regular suit, material prejudice would be caused to them and on satisfaction of other requirements, issued notice and proceeded to determine summarily their right to possession. On enquiry, after considering the pleadings, copies of the documents and other material on record, the District Judge, Srinagar came to the conclusion that the petitioners are entitled to the possession and have an immediate right to possession of residential/commercial properties situated at Hari Singh High Street, except the shop housing the business concern M/S Metal Mart .Ld. District Judge further held that with regard to other specified items of property, the petitioners have no right to exclusive possession being to joint ownership of petitioners late father and his brother, the respondents. These properties, the Judge concluded cannot be said to be held without lawful claim. Therefore, settling of possession with regard to these items has been declined. This pronouncement of the District Judge vide his order dated 29-02-2000 is under challenge in this revision.

2. At the out set, Respondents counsel raises objection to the maintainability of the revision on the ground that the District Judge, Srinagar in terms of provisions of the Act is not a Presiding Officer of Civil Court, but discharges his functions as Persona Designate. As the Act is a special Act, therefore, provisions of general Act have to give way to the provisions of the Special Act. It is further submitted that section 17 and 18 of the Act specifically provide that the decision as to settling of the actual possession shall be final not amenable to any appeal or review. The application of the power of revision of the High Court is necessarily excluded.

3. The counsel for revision petitioner submits that the discharge of duties and functions of District Judge under the Act are our and out judicial in nature and the District Judge answers the description of Presiding Officer of a civil court, as the District Judge is Presiding over a Civil court, thereby negating the concept of Persona Designate. This position is made clear by

Section 18 of the Act which specifically gives finality to the decision of settling the actual possession and specifically mentions that it is to be deemed as "decision of the Judge."

4. The counsel also submits that only because Section 17 of Act saves the right of party to bring a regular suit and the decision under section 18 of the Act is only with regard to settling of the actual possession, it cannot be said that the revisional powers under section 115 CPC are to be excluded. The question of general provisions giving way to the Special Provisions in the context of C.P.C and the Act does not arise.

5. The legislative intent of barring Appeal and review to the aggrieved person alone is manifest. In case the legislative intent to lay an embargo on the exercise of powers of revision had been there then while incorporating embargo on appeal and review, the exercise of revisional powers would have been as well barred.

6. A Full Bench of Punjab Chief Court in 1882 Pun Re 66 (FB) with title Gorakh Nath v. Bishember Nath, while examining the provisions of the Succession (Property Protection) Act in the context of Revision and Section 141 of Civil Procedure Code, came to the conclusion that the order of settling the actual possession in summary proceedings by the District Judge under the Succession (Property Protection) Act is amen-able to th

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