DALAL, C.J. - This was a Small Cause Court, suit brought by a minor plaintiff under the guardianship of Pt. Sona Ju against the defendant. The defence of Limitation wag not accepted by the Court of Small Causes and a decree was passed. The defendant has come to the High Court in revision. The learned Counsel who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff respondent had considerable difficulty in making himself understood by the Court. He quoted several cases which were all examined by the Court but were entirely beside the mark. The next objection he took was to the entertaining of the Implication for revision on the ground that a Small Cause Court had Jurisdiction to try the suit and as that Court had that Jurisdiction the High Court could not interfere in revision. That argument would have been sound for a revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code but the present application is one under the Small Causes Courts Regulation. Under Section 25 of that Regulation the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself that decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to Law may call for the records of the case and pass such orders with respect thereto as it thinks fit. The power of revision of High Court under this section is much wider than that under the Civil Procedure Code. The question at issue would be whether a Court of Small Causes has acted according to Law and in such a case it, will not be enough to urge that the, court has jurisdiction and may exercise it whether rightly or wrongly. The view was held by the Lahore High Court in A. I. R. 1928 page 274 that when a suit has been wrongly dismissed as time barred the point can be re-agitated in the High Court.

The Small Cause Court Judge held that the plaintiff being still a minor he can bring the suit even six years after the accrual of right to sue on 26th Sawan 1981. The Court, however, has forgotten that when the right to sue accrued Kara Koul great grand-father of the plaintiff was alive and could have instituted the suit. When therefore, once time has begin to run subsequent minority of the person entitled to sue cannot stop the time from running. It is definitely laid down in Section 9 of the Limitation Regulation that where once time has begun to run no subsequent, disability or inability to sue stops it. The proviso to that section relates, to letters of administration to the estate of a creditor which have been granted to a debtor. But such is not the case here. The period of Limitation cannot be suspended once it has begun to run unless the suspension is itself provided for in the Act. The suit was filed on 2nd Aasuj 1987 that is more than six years after 26th Sawan 1981 and so was clearly time barred.

Another point urged by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent was that during a portion of this time there was litigation between various members of the family of the plaintiff and the property of the family was in the charge of a receiver. The appointment of a receiver would not stop time from running in a case like the present, when a receiver is appointed, he on behalf of the family should institute suits and the mere appointment, of a Receiver cannot stop Limitation from running and the period of the possession of the receiver cannot be deducted when counting the period of Limitation.

The suit was clearly time barred. I set aside the decree of the Court of Small Causes and dismiss the suit but, having regard to the circumstances of the case I order the parties to bear their own costs in both the Courts.

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