IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
K.V. Gopalakrishnan Nair, J.
Sarba Singh & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Mibarik Singh - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 58/1960, Dated-4-1-1961, Against Order Of Sub-Judge, Kathua, Dated-17-8-1960
Decided On : 04 January, 1961
The trial Court decreed the suit in respect of the Parnalas which discharged water on the wall of .the plaintiffs house, but dismissed the suit in respect of the two Parnalas through which water flowed to the compound of the plaintiffs house. Both sides appealed to the Sub-Judge at Kathua who dismissed the suit in toto on the ground that the suit was barred by time under Art. 119 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiffs have therefore come up in second appeal to this Court.
(2) The only point for determination in this second appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation as held by the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court relied on the residuary Article 119 which is as under:-
| Description of suit. | Period of Limitation | Time from which the period begins to run |
| 119. Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. | Six years. | When the right to sue accrues. |
(3) The evidence in the case was that the three Parnalas in question were in existence prior to six years before the institution of the suit. It follows, inevitably, from this finding that water through these Pamalas was let out for the first time to the plaintiffs compound and the wall of their house more than six years before the plaintiffs instituted the suit for injunction. The lower appellate Court thought that the period of six years must be computed from the date when for the first time water was allowed to flow through the Parnalas on to the precincts and property of the plaintiffs.
If this is the correct position, the lower Courts decision that the suit is barred by limitation will have to be upheld. The question therefore is whether the lower Courts interpretation of the relevant Article of the Limitation Act is correct? The learned counsel for the appellants has rightly contended that each time water is discharged on to the plaintiffs land and property through the Parnalas of the defendant, there will arise a fresh cause of action against the defendant.
In other words every time water is so discharged the right to sue will accrue to the plaintiffs. He has relied upon Sec. 23 of the Limitation Act in this connection. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has striven to urge that section 23 has no application to the present case. I am afraid I cannot accede to this contention. I think in interpreting the Article of the Limitation Act, Sec. 23 ought to have been kept in view by the Court below.
A combined reading of these two provisions seems to my mind to directly lead to the acceptance of the argument urged on behalf of the appellants plaintiffs. Further, the position contended for on behalf of the appellants is supported by the decision of Shadi Lal, C. J., in Nur Mohd. v. Gauri Shankar, AIR 1920 Lah 195. This decision has followed a similar decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sheo Prasad Sonar v. Mangar Manhar, AIR 1914 All 531 : 25 Ind Cas 185. I have no hesitation in accepting these decisions as directly applicable to the facts of the instant case.
(4) The result is that the appeal succeeds and the decision of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the suit is remanded to the lower appellate Court for fresh disposal according to law and in the light of the observations made above. Costs of the suit will abide and follow the result.
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