The appellants must establish the ex-landlord's income tax payer status and the bona fide requirement of the ex-landlord to deny land resumption.

1. In essence these two LPAs aim at an emphatic endeavor on the part of the tenants to deny the right of resumption of land to the ex-landlord on the strength of the mandate of clause (d) sub section 2 Section 7 of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 (for short AR Act) which reads :

"(d) no person, who or any member of whose family, if any, is an income tax payer, shall be eligible to resume any land."

2. The provision is pressed into service in both the LPAs by the appellants to defeat the claim of the ex-landlord, therefore, taken up together for disposal. Undoubtedly, the statute renders the ex-landlord ineligible if he or any member of his family was an income tax payer. But is he the one, reference to the order of the Tehsildar becomes relevant, perusal whereof reveals that in spite of umpteen opportunities provided to the appellants, they have failed to establish the assertion and the situation remained exactly the same before the appellate authority as also before the Tribunal. Upon the basis of the finding of fact returned by the Tehsildar and the forums aforementioned, the learned Single Judge refused to interfere. Before us same objection as indicated above is urged. Although we are alive to the procedural impediment which requires the parties to restrict to the material that was available before the writ Court, yet in the interests of justice besides in view of vehement reiteration of the objection, we chose to deviate and permitted the learned counsel for the appellants to produce before us whatever he has in his armoury to establish the objection but opportunity could not be availed of by him, reason being absence of proof. Situated thus, we have no hesitation to observe that objection is nothing but an ipse dixit of the appellants to frustrate the claim of resumption of ex-landlord. Suffice it to say, evidence to prove that the respondent-ex-landlord was an income tax payer at the relevant point of time being wanting, the writ Court cannot be said to have faltered.

3. Next it was contended that the ex-landlords requirement is not bona fide. To bring home the point, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on Chuni Singh vs. Subedar Raghubir Singh (S.L.J 1985 J&K Page 286) and Mohammad Ashraf Ahanger vs. Ghulam Mohammad Shah and others (S.L.J 1982 J&K page 40). The judgement deals with expression "reasonable requirement" in terms of section 11 (I) (h) of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses & Shops Rent Control Act (for short H&SRC Act). Contention needs to be appreciated in the light of the language of the section itself which makes use of words "reasonable requirement" whereas section 7 of the AR Act does not contain expression "reasonable" but envisages different condition like the one that the ex-landlord takes normal residence in the village where land is situated or in the adjoining village as per the scheme of the AR Act. In this backdrop it appears that reference is made to the judgements supra simply to make it impossible for the respondent to resume the land but the difficulty for the learned counsel for the appellants is that section 11 of the H&SRC Act cannot be read into the AR Act. Reference was also made to M/s. M. Laxmi and Co. Vs. Dr. Anant R. Deshpande and another reported in AIR 1973 SC 171 to canvass that subsequent events should have been taken note of by the writ court but no subsequent event even worth the name is narrated. Suffice it to say that the facts being dissimilar, mandate of the judgements supra has no application to the case on hand.

4. In the aforementioned backdrop, we decline interference with the judgement of the writ Court. Dismissed along with connected CMPs.