(1) This is a restoration application in a civil revision petition which was dismissed for default on 18-4-66. The application for restoration was presented on thar very .day with the allegation that the learned counsel for the petitioner was mistaken about the date of hearing. Objections have been filed by the other side.

(2) A .preliminary objection has been taken that this restoration application does not lie. It is argued by Mr. Sehgal that powers conferred upon the High Court under S. 115 Civil P. C. are of a special character. If the High Court is satisfied that a court subordinate to it has decided a case exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity, the High Court may pass such orders in revision as it thinks fit. The law on revisions is contained in this very section and this section is self-contained. O. 9 or O. 41 has nothing to do with the provisions of this section and do not apply to proceedings under this section According to Mr. Sehgal S. 151 cannot be invoked to entertain an application for restoration of a revision petition dismissed for default.

(3) Mr. Sehgal has further argued that there is a principle and a purpose behind the non-applicability of either O. 9 or O. 41 or S. 151 of the Civil P. C. to civil revisions, because a fresh petition in revision will lie if the original revision petition is dismissed for default The authorities that were cited at the bar as to whether an application for revision dismissed for default can be restored are : -

AIR 1943 Madras 260, AIR 1945 Madras 103 AIR 1962 MP 308, AIR 1953 HP 102, AIR 1928 Lahore 550.

(4) It is true that in 1943 Madras and 1945 Madras (Supra) it is held that the High Court has no power to restore an application of a civil revision which is dismissed for default. Both these judgments are by the same learned Judge, Byers J. The earlier authority 1943 Madras is a very short one and the ratio decidendi of that case, without reference to any reported authority, is that there is no difference between a revision petition under S 115 Civil P. C. and one under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. It further lays down that when a revision petition under either of the aforesaid sections is dismissed for default of appearance, the petition cannot be restored. The latter authority has followed the earlier authority. It is however interesting to read in the latter authority, i. e , 1945 Madras 103 that the High Court has power under S. 115 to dismiss a revision petition for default of appearance. This interpretation is sought to be covered by the words occurring in S 115 to the effect that the court "may make such order as it thinks fit. To my mind with utmost deference to the learned Judge, this authority is too technical and even somewhat self-contradictory. An order as thought fit by the court would suggest that the court would apply its mind to the order under revision and then pass such order about it as it thinks fit. Dismissing a case for default is a mechanical order which shows lack of interest on the part of the petitioner. It the court after examinating the order thinks that the application should be dismissed, that would be an order throught fit by the High Court. The language of S 115 wold suggest that the court has to examine the order in revision and then pass an order with respect to the case which would mean the subject matter of the revision petition as it thinks fit. Therefore in my opinion to take shelter under the words thinks fit is not a correct or at least a reasonable interpretation of the words of that section. I would go so far as to say that if the court dismisses an application in revision for default simply for non-appearance of the petitioner, it is not an order covered by S. 115. It would be an order made under the inherent powers of the court under S. 151 or under S. 141 read w

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