The religious denomination's right to establish and maintain religious institutions is subject to public order, morality, and health of the society, and the acquisition of land for public purposes does not violate these rights.

1. The petitioner Dharmarth Trust has come to this Court with a prayer that instead of paying compensation they be given in exchange the State land. It is submitted that the petitioner is a religious body looking after the management, supervision, control of the Trust in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.

2. It is submitted that land measuring 5 Kanals and 16 Marlas which is a State land comprising in Khasra No. 618 Chand Nagar Jammu was given in exchange of land to one Amrit Malhotra. As indicated above the petitioner submits that instead of paying compensation they be granted alternative site in the city of Jammu. It is stated that some Samadhis were existing on a piece of land measuring 1 Kanal 15 Marlas. This was in Kh. No. 620 situated at below Gumat Jammu. This was known as Samadhi Rajgan.

3. The law does recognise the shifting of Samadhis. If any judicial precedent is required then reference be made to the decision given by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case reported as Akhara Shri Braham Buta v. State of Punjab. Civil Writ No. 8539 of 1988, 1987(2) Legal Reports and Statute 542 wherein it was observed: -

"Learned counsel for the petitioner con-tended that the acquisition was completely violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution as acquisition of religious places is totally prohibited under the Constitution. He relied on Mahant Ram Kishan Dass v. State of Punjab and others 1980(1) SCC 377: (1986) 1 Punjab Legal Reports and Statutes 394 to contend that the Samadh therein had been left out from acquisition and from this it was inferable that since to survival of the Samadh was itself at stake the State voluntarily walked out of the acquisition.

We are not impressed by the arguments of both learned counsel. The institution is quite apart from the brick and mortar which has gone to make the Shiv Mandir and the building in the complex known as Akhara Shri Braham Buta. Descriptively it is said to contain a few Samadhs, some pictures and idols of Hindu dieties besides in the Shiv Temple, the Shiv-ling. The avowed object of the impugned notification is not to preserve the Golden Temple at the pain of death of other surrounding institutions but the effort is founded in larger public interest as seen in Smt. Daljit Kaurs case (supra). The petitioner being a religious denomination cannot as held by Supreme Court in Acharya Maharalshri Narendra Prasadi Anandprasadji Maharaj etc. v. The State of Gujarat and others AIR 1974 SC 2098, claim itself to be a citizen so as to invoke the protection of Article 25 of the Constitution and sequally the protections of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution in the limited area of the present set of facts. Article 26, however, confers on every religious denomination or any section thereof, the right of establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and to administer such property in accordance with law but subject to public order, morality and health of the society. These rights for the religious denominations were also earlier spelled out in Khajamian Wakf Estates etc. v. The State of Madras etc. AIR 1971 SC 61. Article 26 however does not guarantee the freedom to establish and maintain a religious and charitable institution at a particular place or to make it immune from acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The free practice of religion presupposes the practising of it anywhere and not at any particular place. The acquisition of land of such institution does not by itself destroy or completely negative the right of any denomination to establish or maintain any institution for religious purposes. On the receipt of compensation payable on account of the acquisition, the religious denomination can always acquire any other property for the same purpose for which the acquired land was being utilised. In this sense neither is the