The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the entire proceedings taken by the respondents for acquiring his land including the award purported to have been made in respect of it.

(2) The petitioner owns one-half of Khasra No. 1670 measuring 3 Kanals and 7 Marlas and Khasra No. 1670/1 measuring 2 Kanals and 2 Marlas situate in Kishtwar. His allegation is that he obtained no information or notice of any of the proceedings relating to the acquisition of his land and that it was only in January 1960, that he came to know that such proceedings had been taken in respect of his land. Thereupon he set about to obtain copies of the proceedings and after, arming himself with them moved this Court for a writ. The respondents have raised several objections. On facts their main stand is that the petitioner had knowledge of the land acquisition proceedings early enough to enable him to appear before the Collector and to prefer his objections, if any. The legal objections are, firstly, as the land acquisition proceedings terminated much before the coming into force of the State Constitution, the petitioner could not ask for a writ under section 103 of that Constitution and secondly, that as the application for writ is filed several years after the commencement of the land acquisition proceedings, it is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

(3) I shall first deal with the question of delay which was strenuously relied upon by the learned Advocate General for the respondents. The averments in the petitioners affidavit it that he came to know of the land acquisition proceedings only in January 1960 and thereafter he tried to obtain copies of the relevant papers and came to this Court in April 1960. If these averments are true - I have no reason to hold they are otherwise I do not think there is substance in the respondents objection raised on the ground of delay. Further, in a matter of such a serious nature as this where the property of a person is taken away in disregard to the provisions of law, the Court should be very reluctant to reject his petition on the mere ground of delay.

(4) The respondents next urged that as the land acquisition proceedings had come to an end before the coming into force of the State Constitution, the petitioner could not successfully maintain a writ which is founded upon section 103 of that Constitution, A clear answer to this objection is that the petitioner is not relying on section 103 of the State Constitution but on Article 32 (2-A) of the Constitution of India as applied to the State by the Presidents Order of 14th May, 1954. The learned Advocate General has tried to counter this argument on the ground that no fundamental right is involved in the present case. I am unable to agree. In the case on hand the allegation is that the petitioners property has been compulsorily acquired without observing any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act regarding notice, relating to the fixing of the amount of compensation and the specification of the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given. The mere existence of the Land Acquisition Act does not, to my mind, atone for the gross disregard of almost every one of its salutary provisions by the acquiring authority. If it were otherwise it would be possible with impunity to acquire any persons land in the name of the Land Acquisition Act while deliberately disregarding every one of the provisions of that Act.

I am, therefore, satisfied that if the allegations of the petitioner are true, there has been invasion of the fundamental right vouchsafed to the petitioner not only under Article 19 of the Constitution of India but also under Article 31 thereof. There has also been a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. On the case stated by the petitioner the provisions of Article 32(2-A) are attracted and the plea of the impugned proceedings being pre-constitutional cannot avail the respondents.

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