1. By medium of this writ of habeas corpus, the detention order No: 420/ST/87 dated: 8-4-1987 passed by the District Magistrate, Anantnag, under Section 8 of the Public Safety Act (herein-after refer red to as Act) detaining Noor Din Shah Khanadamad of Ghulam Mohammed Shah Resident of Batagund, Verinag, Kashmir, has been challenged on various grounds, as mentioned in the petition

2. No reply affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents despite numerous opportunities given to Additional Advocate General in this behalf, and therefore, the factual allegations made in the petition have remained un-rebutted

3. It may be mentioned here that this petition was dismissed by a learned Single Bench of this Court on 3-9-1987 on some technical grounds, and that decision was later on set aside, by a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No: 8 of 1987, and that is how the case has again come up for adjudication.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued only two legal points to assail the impugned order of detention, which, according to him, are sufficient for quashing of the same.

5. Firstly, he argued that the detaining authority has reproduced verbatim in the grounds of detention the dossier which was submitted to him by the superintendent of Police for detaining of the detenue, and has not applied his mind to the facts of the case to see if at all the provisions or the Act were attracted for his detention. He has referred me to AIR, 1985. SC. 24 wherein it has been held that where there is verbatim reproduction of the dassier in the detention order, then, it is difficult to find greater proof of non-application of mind by the detaining authority.

6. I have thoroughly by examined the dossier submitted by the superintendent of Police, Anantnag, to District Magistrate, Anantnag, as also the grounds of detention formulated by the latter for the detention of the detenue in the present case, and I find the said grounds of detention are nothing but the verbatim reproduction of the dossier as forwarded by the Police to the detaining authority. He has only changed the number of paragraphs, trying in vain to give it a different shape. This is in fact a case of non-application of mind of the detaining authority. Without applying his own mind to the facts of the case. He has acted as an agent of the police. It was his legal duty to find out if the allegations leveled by the police against the detenue in the dossier were really going to effect the maintenance of public order, as a result of the activities, allegedly, committed by him. He had also to find out whether such activities were going to affect the public order is future also as a result of which it was necessary to detain the detain, so as to prevent him from doing so. After all, the preventive detention envisaged under the Act is in fact only to prevent a person from acting in any manner which may be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and not to punish him for his past penal acts. The learned District Magistrate appears to have passed the impugned order in a routine manner being in different to the import of preventive detention as or denied in the Act, Passing of an order without application of mind goes to the root of its validity and in that case, the question of going into the genuineness or otherwise of the grounds does not arise. Having found that the detaining authority has not applied his mind to the facts of the case while passing the impugned order, it is not necessary to go to the merits of the grounds of detention, as mandated by Section 10-A of the Act.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner secondly argued that the order impugned was passed by the District Magistrate as he apprehended that the detenue will get bail in the criminal case in which he stood detained at the time of passing of the order, and that he would again indulge in the activities which were, allegedly, prejudicial to the maintenance of t

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