The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for a strong case, exclusion from partnership property, and the preservation and protection of partnership assets as grounds for the appointment of a receiver in a suit for a dissolved partnership.

1. In a suit pertaining to partnership concern known as Messrs kingsway, Veer Marg Jammu a learned Single Judge of this court (Kotwal J) has passed an order on 30-5-1983 in an application for appointment of a Receiver moved by the plaintiff. The learned single judge has directed the defandants respondents herein to furnish security in the amount of Rs 1,50,000/- to the effect that in case the plaintiff succeeds in the suit the surety shall be liable to pay to him any amount upto the maximum amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- failing which the deputy registrar was directed to attach the goods lying in the shop and other godowns of the firm to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/-and after putting the goods on sale, the sale proceeds were ordered to be deposited in same Bank in the name of the Dy. Registrar, High Court. The amount was to be distributed in accordance with the decree that would eventually be passed finally in the suit.

2. This aforesaid direction proceeded on the assumption that after dissolution of the firm indispute, the assets of the firm have not been distributed in accordance with sections 46 and 48 of the partnership act The learned single Judge has taken the view that prima facie the firm appears to have been dissolved and dissolution is said to have taken place on 17-3-1980 by a deed in writing between the plaintiff and the first defendant. At the same time the trial judge has held that steps have not been taken for winding up of the firm in accordance with law and the plaintiffs share in the firm is lying with the first defendant. Therefore, the first defendant has been asked to furnish the security. Prayer for appointment of a receiver has not been granted and instead direction for filing security has been made.

3. The first defendant has not filed any appeal or cross- objections as regards the findings of the learned single judge about the assets of the firm not having been divided. The plaintiff-appellant alone has filed an appeal against the order of the learned single Judge refusing to appoint a receiver.

4. The plaintiff has claimed several reliefs in the plaint. He seeks a declaration about his status as being a continued partner in the firm. He challenges the alleged deed of dissolution-dated 17-3-1980 as being void and in-effective. He also seeks injunction to enforce the deed of partnership dated 25-2-1977. He seeks, prohibitory injunction, against the second defendant restraining her from interfering in the business of the firm on the basis of deed of partnership, which is termed as void and illegal. In the alternative, the plaintiff has sought a decree for settlement of accounts and determination of the plaintiffs share in the business of the firm as on 17-3-1980. and prays that the, firm be wound up and payment be made to, the plaintiff in respect of his share in the firms assets, profits, good will etc. The first defendant is also sought to be restrained from using the firms name ˜Kingsway and from using the premises of the firm or its good-will.

5. In reply, the defendents have set up defence of the firm

having been dissolved by a deed of dissolution dated 17-3-1980 and its assets having been divided and taken over by the parties to the extent of their share in the firm. Thereafter the firm is said to have been reconstituted and second respondent, herein, who is the wife of the first respondent, is said to have been inducted as a partner by the first respondent in the firm by a deed of partnership dated 8-4-1980, which was made effective from 1-4-1980. Defendants further defence has been that three brothers-in-law of the appellant and the first respondent have settled the matter out of court and the appellant has been paid his due share from the assets of the firm and the firm is now run and owned by the respondents. There are many other defences but for the purpose of this appeal the defence of the respondents indicated above alone is relevant.

6. Simultaneously two applications had been filed by the p