(1) The short question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether Section 5 of the Jammu & Kashmir Limitation Act, 1995 applies to appeals u/s 34 of the .Jammu & Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 1980, hereinafter to be referred to as the Act.

(2) The appellant Pushpa Devi lost her petition u/s 12 of the Act in the court of District Judge, Jammu, on 24-2-1981 and offered an appeal against the aforesaid judgment in the High Court on 2-5-1981. Since it was beyond thirty days, the period of limitation provided for it by Section 34 of the Act, she also moved an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of the delay on various grounds. When this application came up for consideration before Honble the Acting Chief Justice an objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to appeals u/s 34 of the Act, which itself prescribed period of limitation for appeals, as its application to such appeal was clearly excluded by Section 29 of the Limitation Act. Reliance was also placed upon a Single Bench decision of this court in Sureshta Devi Vs. Omkar Lal, 1981 K. L. J. 427. The learned Acting Chief Justice being of the view that Section 5 being an independent provision which had nothing to do with computation of period of limitation, its application could not be deemed to have been excluded by Section 29 and referred the case to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the view taken in 1981 K. L. J. 427 (Supra).

(3) Section 29 of the Jammu and Kashmir Limitation Act, which is a facsimile of Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1980, barring Sub-section (3) and (4) of the Central Act, which do not occur in the State Act, and are also relevant for the present discussion, reads as under: -

"29. Savings.-(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Contract Act (IX of 1977).

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first Schedule the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law-

(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and

(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply."

(4) On the plain language of Sub-section (2) once it is shown that the special or local law under which the suit, application, or appeal is brought, provides for it a period of limitation different from the one provided therefor by the first Schedule, all provisions of the Limitation Act, except those contained in sections 3, 4, 9 to 18 and 22 shall have no application to such suit, application or appeal proprio vigore. Even the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 9 to 18 and 22 shall have no application in so far and to the extent to which they are expressly excluded by the special or local law under which the suit application or appeal is brought. With due respect to the learned Acting Chief Justice, there is no warrant for the proposition that Section 5 is independent of Section 29 and has nothing to do with reckoning of the period of limitation. Period of limitation is prescribed by the first schedule. How that period is to be reckoned in different cases under different circumstances, has been provided by various sections of the Limitation Act, including Sec. 5 which too has the effect of extending the same in certain given cases on proof of sufficient cause. It is therefore, idle to contend that this section has no bearing on the computation of period of limitation prescribed under the first Schedule. Unless, therefore, Section 5 is specifically made applicable to any suit, appeal or application by the special