1. Parties had referred their disputes to the arbitration and pursuant there to the award was published by the arbitrator. Notice of filing of the award was given to them on 7-8-1993. Petitioner filed his objections to the award on 30-8-1993 and in Para C whereof he alleged that "the arbitrator had misconducted and had failed to follow the provisions and the procedure relating to the arbitration and the award deserved to be set aside". In the prayer clause, however, he prayed that the amount awarded by the arbitrator may be released in his favour and the award be made a rule of the court to that extent.

2. Respondent also filed objections to the award under Sec. 30/33 of the Arbitration Act and sought its setting aside on the ground that the arbitrator has misconducted himself. The petitioner has now filed C.M.P. No: 182/ 94 seeking leave of the Court to withdraw his earlier objections filed by him on 30-8-1993. The respondent-corporation is vehemently resisting this on the plea that since the averment made by the petitioner in Para C of his objections filed on 30-8-1993 alleging misconduct constituted his admission within the meaning of Sec. 17 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, he could not be allowed to withdraw these objections and to pray that the award be made a rule of the Court now.

3. The short question that arises for determination is: Whether the averment made in Para C of the petitioners earlier application, is in the nature of allegation or constitutes admission by him within the meaning of Sec. 17 of the Evidence Act to raise estoppel disabling him to withdraw his objections and to pray for making the award a rule of the Court.

4. The issue has been hotly contested on both sides. According to Mr. Bhardwaj, the averment, contained in Para C of the petitioners first application, is an admission which is binding on him and from which he could not retract. It is a conscious statement made by him which could form the basis for setting aside the award and that he could not be allowed to wriggle out of it now on a second thought. He alternatively contended that the objections filed by him, being a pleading, could be withdrawn only on satisfying the requirements of Order 23 C.P.C and as his application for withdrawal fell short of the requirements laid down therein, he could not be allowed to withdraw his first objections dated 30-8-1993. He has drawn support from AIR 1986 Allahabad 126, AIR 1951 Travencore Cochin 109, AIR 1979 S.C. 861 on the first point and AIR 1956 Calcutta 577 on the second.

5. Mr. Goni, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other end, argued that the petitioners prayer in both the applications was identical viz, to make the award a rule of the Court partly and the averment contained in Para C of the first objections was only a generalised and bald allegation which required proof and the satisfaction of the Court to result in vitiating the award. It could not be treated as "Admission" by any logic because the Admission in terms of Sec. 17 of the Evidence Act, is a statement sugggesting inference as to any fact in issue between the parties. That being so, allegation of misconduct made against an arbitrator in Para C of the first objections could not be said to be a statement made by the petitioner suggesting any inference as to any fact in issue between the parties.

6. Since the rival contentions centred round the connotation of the word "Admission" within the meaning of Sec. 17, it would be advantageous to extract the relevant section which reads thus: -

" An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact and which is made by any of the persons and under the circumstances here-under mentioned."

A plain reading of the section shows that an admission by a person, is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests an inference as to any fact in issue or a relevant fact and which is made by any person and under the circumstances mentio

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