1. This appeal arises out of an order passed by District Judge, Jammu, u/s 24 of the Jammu & Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, hereinafter to be referred to as the 1955 Act, which corresponds to Section 30 of the Jammu & Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, 1980, hereinafter to be referred to as the 1980 Act, granting maintenance pendente life at the rate of Rs. 500/- per mensum and a further sum of Rs. 2.000/- on account of litigation expenses in favour of the respondent.

2. The respondent brought an application u/s 9 of the 1955 Act against the appellant in the court of District Judge, Jammu. On 24-8-1979, she made an application u/s 24 of the said Act that she having no independent income sufficient for her support and the necessary expenses of litigation, the appellant may be ordered to pay to her a sum of Rs. 500/- per mensem as maintenance and a further sum of Rs. 2.000/- by way of litigation expenses. This application was resisted by the appellant on the ground that his total income was Rs. 500/-per month, which he was drawing by way of salary as an employee of Vir and Co a business concern at Srinagar exclusively owned by his mother. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases and the learned District Judge on consideration of the same eventually came to the conclusion that the appellant was earning something in the neighbourhood of Rs. 4,000/- per month and was also maintaining a car and that the respondent required at least a sum of Rs. 2,000/- to meet the litigation expenses and Rs. 500/- per mensem as maintenance. He, accordingly passed the impugned order.

2. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondent that in view of the specific provisions of Section 34 of the 1980 Act, no appeal lay against the impugned order which passed after the aforesaid Act came into force. There is considerable force in this objection. Prior to the coming into force of the 1980 Act provision for appeals was made in Section 28 of the 1955 Act. This section was much wider in scope than Section 34 of the 1980 Act in that, it provided for appeals against every order passed by the court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction; the only exception being appeal on the subject of costs only. Right of appeal against orders has been restricted under sub-section (2) of Sec. 34 to orders passed under sections 31 and 32 of the 1980 Act only; appeal on the subject of costs of course being barred under this section also. Sec. 31 relates to permanent alimony and maintenance which the court may grant at the time of passing any decree or at any time even subsequent thereto and Sec. 32 pertains to orders in regard to custody of children. The impugned order, as already noticed, has been passed u/s 30 of the 1980 Act which does not find mention in Sub section (2) of Sec. 34. No appeal, therefore, lies against an order passed u/s 30. To this extent, therefore the preliminary objection prevails.

3. Even so, the next question to be determined is whether the appellant is really out of court for all intents and purposes. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even if no appeal is competent against the impugned order, the court has ample power to examine its correctness in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 Civil Pro Code. He has, therefore, prayed that this appeal may be treated as a revision and disposed of as such. The argument in reply, however, is that the 1980 Act being a complete code in itself, there is no room for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court when the aforesaid Act itself does not provide that an order passed by a court under the Act would be revisable u/s 115.

4. The High Court, u/s 115 can call for the record of any case which has been decided by a court subordinate to it, and in which no appeal lies to it. This power has to course to be exercised under certain circumstances specified in Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 115 but the two conditions that must be satisf

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