1. This revision petition is aimed at over-setting an order of the trial court directing the plaintiff petitioner to remove the door which he has installed in the stairs which the respondents claim to be the common stairs of the houses belonging to the parties.

2. The petitioner brought a suit for declaration and injunction against the respondents that he was the exclusive owner of the stairs which the respondents had no right to use and that they may be permanently restrained from using the same. The trial court issued an adinterim exparte infunction on 26-5-1977 interdicting the respondents from using the stairs. On 28-5-1977, however, the said order was vacated by it after hearing the respondents. The petitioner filed an appeal before District-Judge, Poonch against the said order, who on the petitioners application for ad-interim stay passed the following order :

Stay mean while.

This order was also communicated to the trial court, which on 18-9-1977 issued a notice to the respondents that its order dated 28-5-1977 had been stayed by the appellate court, and that its earlier order dated 26-5-1977 stood revived, which the respondents were bound to obey. In the mean-time, it appears, the petitioner installed a door in the stairs with the result that the passage of the respondents was thereby blocked even otherwise. The respondents made an application under Order 39 R. 1 read with Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure inviting the trial court to issue mandatory injunction against the petitioner, directing him to remove the door. An objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner that after the appellate court had issued the aforesaid stay order, the trial court had ceased to have any jurisdiction to entertain such an application and pass any order on it. This objection did not weigh with the trial court, which consequently allowed the application of the respondents, and ordered the petitioner to remove the door. It is this order which has been assailed in this revision petition.

3. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Sethi has contended that the moment the appellate court of District Judge, Poonch, issued the stay order, powers of the trial court to deal with the respondents application had been clearly taken away. The trial court, argued the learned counsel, was bound to obey the order of the appellate court, and had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondents application and pass any order on it.

4. Mr. Bakhshi appearing for the respondents has, on the other hand, contended that the trial court retained its powers to deal with all matters, which were either collateral or incidental to the main suit, inspite of the fact that the appellate court had issued a stay order, added the learned counsel, was much too vague and on which failed to disclose its extent of application. In any case, argued Mr. Bakhshi, the stay could be limited to the injunction matter only, and to no other matter, Viewed thus, argued the learned counsel, the trial courts jurisdiction to deal with any matter which was not subject matter of the appeal could not be said to have been taken away. Learned counsel for the parties have also relied upon a number of authorities in support of their respective contentions.

5. Controversy in this case has in fact been trigged off by the ridiculously brief and cryptic stay order issued by the District Judge, which comprises of merely two words, viz; stay meanwhile. These words were indeed incapable of conveying as to what the District Judge intended to stay, i.e., whether he intended to stay the entire proceedings in the suit before the trial court, or he intended to stay the operation of the order challenged before him in the appeal. In these circumstances, therefore, this order cannot be said to be capable of an extended application, so as to cover the entire gamut of the proceedings before the trial court and its application has to be restricted to the order impugned in the appeal or at the most, to that part of the pr

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