1959 Supreme(J&K) 19
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
Janki Nath Wazir,S. Murtaza Fazl Ali, JJ.
Bakshi Tirath Ram & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Registering Authority, J&K - Respondent
Writ Petition No. 20 And 21/1959
Decided On : 08 June, 1959
Advocate For Appellant: Lok Nath Sharma
Advocate For Appellant: G.L. Dogra
Advocate For Appellant: D.P. Dhar
Advocate For Respondent: J.N. Bhan
(1) These are two writ petitions impugning the notification of the Registering Authority published in the daily newspaper Sandesh Jammu on 25-4-1959 specifying certain places in Jammu where the stage carriages could stand and prohibiting them to stand at any other place except the specified places, and further prescribing time for the entry of the vehicles into the city for picking up passengers and load for being carried to different places. These petitions are filed by Bakhshi Tirath Ram son of Bakhshi Guranditta resident of Mohalla Mastgarh Jammu, who is the owner of a stage carriage vehicle No. J and K 6021 which plies on Jammu Poonch route, and by Sardar Avtar Singh resident of Mohalla Mubarak Mandi, proprietor of Avtar Motor Garage, Shalamar Road, Jammu. They have prayed that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the notification passed by the Registering Authority and directing him not to implement such notifications. Both these petitions will be disposed of by this order.
(2) We will deal with the points raised by the petitioners impugning the notification passed by the Registering Authority on 25-4-1959.
(3) The petitioners have alleged in their petitions that they are the State subjects and are carrying on business in Jammu. They have averred that the notification infringes Art. 19 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it infringes the right of the petitioners to hold property and carry on any business or profession. It is further alleged that the notification is illegal, ultra vires and bad in law because it is discriminatory inasmuch as it discriminates between stage carriages and hence violates Art. 11 of the Constitution. Lastly it is urged that the Transport Controller has no authority to pass such notifications under rule 7-12 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 2003, nor is he the prescribed authority validly appointed. Avtar Singh petitioner has further mentioned in his petition that the respondent had no authority to order that no stage carriage may be stationed at any place other than those specified by him. It is submitted that the respondent by his notification prohibited the stage carriages to come up to his (petitioner™s) garage and stand there till they are repaired and thus has infringed Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as he is unable to carry on his business of repairing motor vehicles.
(4) We shall first deal with the question whether the Registering Authority was competent to pass the impugned notification.
(5) The order purports to have been passed under rule 7-12 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 2003. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that it was the Inspector General of Police who was competent to pass an order under rule 7-12 of the Rules and not the Transport Controller.
(6) In rule 7-12 of the Rules which are made under the Motor Vehicles Act the Inspector-General of Police has been authorised by the Government to make an order permitting any place to be used as a stand and without such an order no place should be so used. But by a subsequent order of the Council No. 100-C of 1948 dated 30-4-1948 the Transport Controller was invested with the powers of the Inspector-General of Police. That is to say, in rule 7-12 instead of the Inspector-General of Police the authority appointed by the Government was the Transport Controller.
(7) The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that substituting the word Transport Controller in place of Inspector-General of Police in rule 7-12 would amount to an amendment of the rule which ought to have been made in accordance with the provisions of S. 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with S. 23 of the General Clauses Act.
(8) It is not disputed that the Government under S.76 of the Motor Vehicles Act has power to determine places at which motor vehicles may stand indefinitely or for a specific period of time and also to determine the places at which public service vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and sett