An order making an arbitration award rule of the court must be a judgment containing the grounds for the decree or order, and an order that is perverse and perfunctory is liable to be quashed.

O. P. Sharma, J. - The admitted facts of the case are that a dispute arising out of an arbitration agreement between the petitioner and M/s. Swastic Construction Company had been referred to the Sole Arbitrator who made the award on 31-12-1992. On the application of Construction Company (respondent No. 1), the Arbitrator filed the award in the Court of Additional District Judge, Jammu to which the petitioner filed a composite application under Section 30/33 of the Arbitration Act challenging the award on various grounds. By an ex parte order dated 4-4-1994, the award was made rule of the Court.

2. An application filed on behalf of Union of India for restoration of proceedings came to be dismissed by Court order dated 17-7-1995 and the appeal challenging the same was dismissed by order dated 6-2-1996 with liberty reserved to the petitioner to prosecute any other remedy available under law. The petitioner has moved this petition for quashing the order dated 4-4-1994, being perverse.

3. The respondents have questioned the maintainability of the petition on the grounds :

(i) that it raises disputes questions of facts; and

(ii) that the matter stands finally concluded in view of the dismissal of appeal challenging the order dated 17-7-1995 with out challenging the decree.

4. The facts which are not disputed are that the case was dismissed in default on 4-4-1994. However, soon after another order making the award rule of the Court was passed but without recalling the order of dismissal. Thus ex parte order was passed on the request of the counsel for the petitioner after the order of dismissal had been signed and announced also.

5. On May 4,1994, application was filed on behalf of Union of India on the ground that the case had been adjourned to 4-5-1994, but was taken upon for hearing on 4-4-1994 without notice to their Standing counsel who came to know about the order dated 4-4-1994 when he appeared in the Court on 4-5-1994, the date fixed. This fact has been specifically pleaded in the application, as is evident in para 1 of the order passed by the trial Court on 17-7-1995, which reads :

"This is an application for restoration of a petition moved by Union of India under section 30 of Arbitration Act which was dismissed in default by this Court order dated 4-4-1994. The application has been moved on the ground that the date given to him by the Court was not 4-4-1994 but was 4-5-1994 and the date was changed in his absence and as such he could not appear in the Court on the due date i.e., on 4-4-1994 resulting in dismissal of the application and his absence was not intentional and it was because of change of date not to his knowledge."

However, this application was dismissed by the Court, on the grounds that :

(i) since the award has been made rule of the Court, therefore, only an appeal was maintainable; and

(ii) the application was filed beyond the period of limitation.

6. The petitioner had also preferred an appeal (CIMA No. 154 of 1995) along with application for condonation of delay (CMP No. 43 of 1996) which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 6-2-1996. While dismissing the application for condonation of delay, a learned single Judge of this Court observed that :

"......... even if the delay is condoned no appeal is maintainable under the provisions of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act ...........,"

He further observed that :

".......... However, in the interest of justice appellants are liberty to prosecute any other remedy which is available to them in law, if so advised."

7. Before analysing the legal issue involved, it is necessary to refer to the facts of the case. The minutes of the proceedings of the trial Court indicate that application under section 30/33 of the Arbitration Act was filed on 31-1-1994 and the case was adjourned to 19-2-1994 for framing of issues. It was again adjourned for the same purpose to 31-3-1994. On this date, the case was again adjourned to 4-5-1994, but figure "5" was then chang