The judgment emphasizes the circumscribed power of review, the distinction between a mere erroneous decision and a decision vitiated by 'error apparent,' and the requirement for any sufficient reason to be analogous to the specified grounds for review.

JUDGMENT :

1. This petition by the petitioner is for seeking review of the judgment dated 19.7.2017 passed in SWP No. 1739/2016, whereby the writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed and the order impugned in the writ petition passed by respondent No. 2 was upheld.

2. The review has been sought inter alia on the ground that the writ petition has been disposed of in the absence of objections by the respondent-Education Department and that another candidate namely Ishtaq Hussain who was similarly situated with the petitioner and also belonged to habitation Kanger has been appointed as RET in the Primary School, Kanger and therefore, different yard stick could not have been applied to the petitioner. This court, thus, committed an error apparent on the face of record by not taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect.

3. Before we appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to take notice of the settled legal position with regard to the scope of interference in review jurisdiction. There is subtle but real distinction existing between the power of review, on one hand, and the power of the appellate court on the other. Order 47 Rule 1 circumscribes power of review by specifying three grounds on which review is possible, specific ground being (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which despite exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicants' knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when decree or order was passed (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

4. Having taken into account the aforesaid three grounds, which Order 47 Rule 1 CPC embodies as the ground for review, the Supreme Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Mar Paulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 held that the power of review is circumscribed of three grounds which have been specified in Order 47 Rule 1. In the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court further held that "any other reason" cannot be "any sufficient reason" but reason, which is "sufficient" and at the same time, atleast "analogous" to one of the two reasons as indicated hereinbefore namely (i) discovery of new or important matter which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of applicant etc. (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of record.

5. In short, thus, what Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos (supra) laid down was that expression, "any other sufficient reason" cannot be construed as any sufficient reason and that any sufficient reason, cannot become a ground for review unless even such sufficient reason is analogous to one of the other two grounds i.e. discovery of new facts and mistake or error apparent on the face of record. Rule 65 of the J&K High Court Rules, 1999 clearly provides that the High Court may review its judgment or order but no application for review shall be entertained except on the grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

6. In Tunga Bhara Industries Limited vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1964) 5 SCR 174, the Supreme Court in clear terms held that there was a real distinction between the mere erroneous decision and decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent" and that a review was by no means appeal in disguise. This legal position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in subsequent judgments also.

7. In the light of settled position of law, defining the contours exercise of power of review, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner may be examined.

8. The contention of the petitioner that the writ petition could not have been disposed of without inviting objections from the respondent-Education Department and therefore, the judgment sought to be reviewed is vitiated is devoid of any merit and therefore, cannot be accepted. The writ petition when it came up for consideration before us was for admission and therefore, this court afte