V. K. GUPTA, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Section 53 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, is directed against an order dated 19. 2. 2001, passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Bokaro, in Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2000, whereby, exercising his appellate jurisdiction with respect to the appeal filed by opposite party No. 2, he set aside the Order of the Court below and directed that enquiry be held under Section 32 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, to find out the age of the petitioner at the relevant date.

( 2 ) THE Trial Court had held the petitioner to be a juvenile within the meaning and scope of the Juvenile Justice Act. 1986. On appeal filed by opposite party No. 2, the Appellate Court did not find itself in agreement with the findings of the Trial Court on most of the issues and. accordingly, set aside the judgment under appeal before it.

( 3 ) THE offence was allegedly committed on 31. 12. 1998. It is the contention of the opposite party no. 2 that the date of birth of the petitioner as recorded in the School Leaving Certificate is 18. 12. 1981 and that he was produced before the Juvenile Justice Court for the first time on 3. 3. 2000 and, therefore, on the date of his production in the Court he was more than 16 years. As per the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, persons below 16 years alone were considered to be juveniles.

( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Appellate Court was wrong in holding and deciding that the age of 16 years or above is material and relevant as on the date of production of the accused in the Court. According to him, the material date in determining the age of the accused for the purposes of the Act is the date of occurrence of the offence. As rightly held by the Court below, this controversy has now been set at rest totally and absolutely by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amit Das v. State of Bihar, wherein their Lordships have very clearly and unequivocally declared as binding proposition of law that the age of 16 years would be relevant and material on the date the accused is produced in the Court and not on the date of occurrence of the offence.

( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying upon Section 69 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. 2000, has also argued that because of Subsection (2) of Section 69 (supra), the age of juvenile as defined in Section 2 (k) of 2000 Act, should be taken into account and the same having been prescribed as 18 years, the petitioner not having completed 18 years even on the day he was produced in the Court, he should be treated as juvenile. The argument has no merit, because even though 2000 Act has repealed the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, Sub-section (2) of Section 69 thereof, dearly says any action taken under 1986 Act is saved. In any case as on 3. 3. 2000 when the petitioner was produced before the Competent Court. 2000 Act had not come into force. At that point of time, 1986 Act held the field and as per the definition of juvenilet as occurring in Section 2 (h) of 1986 Act, age of a juvenile as prescribed and being relevant on that was 16 years. It is only after coming into force of 2000 Act that 18 years could be considered the age when a person would be deemed to be juvenile.

( 6 ) EVEN though the learned Appellate Court while disposing of the appeal, has directed that the enquiry be held afresh in terms of Section 32 of the 1986 Act (the enquiry is now required to be conducted in terms of Section 49 of 2000 Act), I have no hesitation in adding a rider to the aforesaid direction. My rider is that even though the Trial Court should conduct enquiry afresh with respect to the age of the petitioner, as on 3. 3. 2000 (the scope of the enquiry being related and confined to decide the only fact whether on that date the petitioner was of 16 years or more), the learned Trial Court only, for