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2002 Supreme(Jhk) 69

High Court Of Jharkhand
Judgename : VINOD KUMAR GUPTA
SARIMONI MAHATO - Appellant
Versus
AMULYA MAHATO - Respondents
CRIMINAL REVISION 458 Of 2001
Decided On : 01/24/2002

Advocates Appeared:
JAYA ROY, TAPAS RAY

The central legal point established in the judgment is that the element of consent is crucial in determining the offence of rape under Section 375, IPC, and consent given under the belief of future marriage does not amount to a misconception of fact.

Headnote:

consent - Criminal Law - Section 375, IPC - Section 90, IPC

Fact of the Case:

The case involved the acquittal of the respondent No. 1 of the charge under Section 376, IPC, based on the allegation of rape by the prosecutrix (P. W. 1) who claimed that the respondent had established an illicit sexual relationship with her under the promise of marriage, resulting in her pregnancy.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse and that the element of consent was the most important ingredient for constituting the offence of rape. The court also emphasized that the consent given under the belief of future marriage did not amount to a misconception of fact.

Issues: The main issue revolved around the element of consent and whether the respondent's actions constituted the offence of rape under Section 375, IPC.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the acquittal of the respondent was warranted and justified, emphasizing that the prosecutrix being a consenting party could not accuse the respondent of rape, especially after repeated episodes of sexual intercourse lasting for more than 11/2 years.

Final Decision: The petition was dismissed without any orders as to costs.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

  1. The element of consent is crucial in establishing the offence of rape under Section 375 of the IPC. Consent given under the belief of future marriage does not constitute a misconception of fact (!) (!) .

  2. The case involved the acquittal of the respondent on charges of rape, where the prosecutrix claimed that the respondent established an illicit sexual relationship under the promise of marriage, which led to her pregnancy (!) (!) .

  3. The court found that the prosecutrix was a consenting participant throughout the sexual relationship, which lasted for more than 1.5 years, and only after becoming pregnant did she claim otherwise (!) (!) .

  4. The legal definition of rape emphasizes that sexual intercourse against the will or without consent constitutes the offence. Consent under misconception of fact, especially based on promises of future marriage, does not amount to a misconception of fact if the woman understood the situation and consented voluntarily (!) (!) .

  5. The court highlighted that consent given on the premise of marriage, which the woman believed the man would fulfill, does not automatically negate her consent nor convert the act into rape if she was a consenting party (!) .

  6. The court rejected the argument that the consent was given under a misconception of fact, clarifying that the woman's belief in marriage was based on her understanding of the promise, not a false representation of fact (!) .

  7. The court emphasized that if the woman consented to sexual intercourse based on the belief that she would marry the man, such consent was valid, and the subsequent failure to marry does not retroactively make the act non-consensual or constitute rape (!) .

  8. The decision referenced legal principles that consent based on a promise of marriage, which the woman believed in at the time, does not amount to a misconception of fact, and therefore, the offence of rape was not established in this case (!) .

  9. The court concluded that the respondent's acquittal was justified, and the prosecution should not have been initiated under these circumstances. The petition was dismissed without costs (!) .

  10. Overall, the judgment underscores the importance of genuine consent and clarifies that consent given under the belief of future marriage, without any false representation or misconception of fact, does not constitute rape under the law.


Judgment :

VINOD KUMAR GUPTA, J.

( 1 ) THIS Criminal Revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 14/08/2001 passed by the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Seraikella in S. Tr. case No. 20 of 1997 whereby he has acquitted the respondent No. 1 of the charge under Section 376, I. P. C. by holding him not guilty for the same.

( 2 ) THE charge under Section 376, IPC on which the respondent No. 1 was tried related to and revolved around P. W. 1, the alleged so-called victim. According to her, respondent No. 1 who was her co-villager used to come to her house off and on whenever she was alone in the last 11/2 years. It was her case that the respondent No. 1 used to assure her that he would marry her and based on this assurance he established illicit sexual relationship with P. W. 1 repeatedly for long periods due to which she became pregnant. It has also come in her deposition that while respondent No. 1 used to have sexual intercourse with her, and when she had become pregnant, she came to learn that he had married another lady and on enquiry he assured P. W. 1 that he will marry her also. On this, an adjudicatory process was set in motion in the village Panchayat in which respondent No. 1 denied to keep P. W. 1 as his wife or to marry her and it was on this refusal on the part of respondent No. 1 that the prosecutrix (P. W. 1) lodged F. I. R. against respondent No. 1 under Section 376, IPC alleging that he had raped her.

( 3 ) UNDOUBTEDLY P. W. 1 at all relevant times was a major. It is not the case of the prosecution that while both were having illicit sexual intercourse with each other, P. W. 1 was a minor at any point of time. The entire prosecution case was built round the allegation of rape on the basis of the consent element.

( 4 ) rape has been defined in Section 375, IPC. Insofar as it is relevant for our purposes, the extract of Section 375, IPC reads thus :-"rape : A man is said to commit rape who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions :- first : Against her will. Secondly : Without her consent. "section 90, I. P. C. in so far as the question of consent relatable to Section 375, IPC is concerned, states as under :- "consent known to be given under fear or misconception : a consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception or consent of insane person : if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or consent of child : unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.

( 5 ) A bare look at Section 375, I. P. C. clearly suggests that the offence of rape, meaning thereby a man having sexual intercourse with a woman, is said to have been committed if the man has such sexual intercourse with the woman either against her will or without her consent. It is only in such cases where the woman is under 16 years of age that the consent is immaterial. In such cases, the act of having sexual intercourse, with or without consent amounts to the offence of committing rape on such woman who is under 16 years of age. ( 6 ) VIEWED in the aforesaid legal perspective and the definition of rape vis-a-vis the consent element, as provided for in Section 375, IPC when we consider the evidence on record which is mainly the deposition of the prosecutrix herself, what emerges manifestly clear is that the respondent No. 1 and the prosecutrix were having sexual intercourse with each other and that the prosecutrix all along was a consenting party to such sexual intercourse. She was also a wil







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