The main legal point established in the judgment is the exclusive power of the Electricity Regulatory Commission to determine and approve tariffs, and the binding nature of the approved tariff.

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The appellant-Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi, is aggrieved against the order passed, by the learned Single Judge dated 17th September, 2010 in W.P. (C) No. 2613 of 2010 and W.P. (C) 2626 of 2010, by which both the writ petitions were allowed holding that after coming into force of the new tariff as prescribed by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the appellant-Board cannot fall back upon either tariff of the year 1993 and insertion of Schedule to the tariff in they year 1999 or upon the contract on the basis of which the appellant-Board used to charge "Demand Charge" from the respondent-consumer obviously under the tariff of 1993 as well as by virtue of the condition in the contract.

3. Brief facts of the case are that before coming into force of the Electricity Act, 2003, there was Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the parties were governed by the Act of 1910 and 1948. The respondent-consumers entered into a contract with the appellant-Electricity Board and agreed that they would be liable to pay the "monthly minimum demand charge on the basis of the actual minimum demand of the month or 75% of the contract demand, whichever is higher and energy charges based on load factor of 25%, 30%, 50% etc." That condition is incorporated in the tariff of the year 1993 in Column 15.2. and in consonance with that conditions, the same condition was incorporated in the agreement executed by the respondent-Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission in Clause 4(C).

4. The condition 4(C) is that "maximum Demand Charges for supply in any month will be based on the maximum KVA demand for the month or 75% of the contract demand, whichever is higher subject to provisions of Clause 13. For the twelve months' service, the maximum Demand Charges for any month will however be based on the actual monthly maximum demand for that month." The respondents were paying the Demand Charges according to the tariff of the year 1993 as well as under the terms of the contract referred above.

5. The new Electricity Act, 2003 came into force from 10.6.2003 and as per Section 85 of the Act of 2003 the State Regulatory Commission in the State of Jharkhand was also constituted and by invoking the provision of Section 86 of the Act of 2003, the new Electricity Tariff Order was issued and was made effective form 1st January, 2004. The contention of the respondent-writ petitioner in the writ petition was that after coming into force of the new tariff order 2003-04, the appellant-Electricity Board can charge any amount from the respondent which is provided m the Tariff Order of 2003-04 and not as per tariff order/Schedule of 1993 or under the agreement executed between the Board and consumer.

6. The contention of the Electricity Board was that the all acts done and contract executed between the parties prior to coming into force of the Act of 2003 have been saved by Section 85 of the Act of 2003, therefore, the respondent is bound by the terms of contract which has beer, executed under the provisions of he Electricity Act, 1993 as well as Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the condition contained in that contract has not been challenged by the respondents. It is also submitted that not only that, but the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission itself was fully conscious of the facts that some of the issues have been left by the Commission while giving out the Tariff Order of 2003-04 and it has been made clear in the last column i.e., column No. 14 in the Tariff Order 2003-04 itself, it was made clear specifically that "all other terms and conditions in respect of Meter Rent, Supply at Lower Voltage, Capacitor Charge, Circuit-Breaker Charge, Electricity Duty, rebate, security deposit, surcharge for exceeding contract demand etc. shall remain the same as existing in the State". Therefore, by clause 1.4 referred above, the Commission declared that the