2013 Supreme(Jhk) 128
HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND
PRAKASH TATIA, CJ AND JAYA ROY, JJ.
M/s Central Coalfields United & Ors.- Appellants
Vs.
Anil Kumar Lal - Respondent
LPA No. 249 of 2012
Decided On : 24.1.2013
For the Appellants: M/s G. Mustafa, Arvind Kr. Mehta, S.K. Sharma, Sharib Mustafa.
For the Respondent: M/s V. Shivnath, Rahul Kumar, Vijay Kumar Gupta, V. Kumar, K. Sundaram.
Headnote:Constitution of India---Article 226---Writ petition filed for recovery of fees amount by Advocate for his appearance in court—Every professional engagement of an advocate, may it be for Government or Government undertaking is not an engagement to perform "public duty"---No writ can lie for recovery of an amount under a contract of rendering professional service by advocate-writ petition not maintainable. (Paras 6 and 8)
(1991)1 SCC 212; (2005)6 SCC 657-Distinguished.
1992(O) GLHEL-SC 11520-Followed.
WP(C) 4267/2006-Set aside.
By Court. - Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The respondent-petitioner, who is an Advocate, preferred a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4267 of 2006 and prayed that writ be issued against the respondent-appellant with respect to the payment of his fees for the cases which he conducted, @ Rs. 550/- per appearance, as was fixed for appearance in the district court in a contract between the parties. The admitted facts of the case is that the petitioner-Advocate earlier filed a suit for recovery of certain fees amount (for conducting some other cases) against the same very appellant, which was decreed by the trial court. Instead of filing another suit for recovery of fees for other cases, the petitioner tiled present writ petition for recovery of his fee amount.
3. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition, directing the respondent-appellant to calculate the total amount of arrears towards bill and also interest @ 9% per annum on the total amount due from the date the writ petition was instituted i.e., 1st August; 2006. This judgment dated 20th April, 2012 is under challenge before us.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that writ petition of an Advocate for his fees is not maintainable, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, delivered in the case of Improvement Trust, Ropar through its Chairman vs. S. Tejinder Singh Gujral, reported in 1992(O) GLHEL-SC 11520.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner vehemently submitted that Advocate is discharging the public duty and, therefore, in view of the above reason, the writ petition was maintainable. It is submitted that in view of the fact that earlier decision was given by the civil court, wherein the rate of fees has already stand concluded/decided by virtue of the judgment passed against the appellant and, therefore, there is no dispute with respect to the quantification of the amount. It is also not in dispute that the writ petitioner was Advocate of the appellant and, therefore, in that fact situation also the writ was maintainable.
6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the facts of the case.
It is not in dispute that earlier writ petitioner filed a suit and he got the decree in the matter of fee for particular case at particular rates and that decree attained the finality. However, question arises is whether the petitioner, who was rendering a professional service to the appellant was discharging a public function, which is required to be considered in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors, reported in (1991)1 S.C.C. 212, wherein issue involved was with respect to the termination of the appointment of all Government Counsel in all districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh, wherein question was decided that what is the role of the Government Counsel, who got the appointment from the Government. In that context, said judgment was rendered and in this case admittedly the writ petitioner gave his service under a private contract to its client, may it be to a Public Sector Undertaking, but it was not more than that of rendering services by the petitioner to the Public Sector Undertaking as a private person and was not discharging any public duty. Advocate's contract with his client is relevant to decide what duty the advocate was discharging. Every professional engagement of an advocate, may it be for Government or Government undertaking is not an engagement to perform "public duty".
7. In the case of Binny Ltd. & Another Vs. V. Sadasivan & Ors. reported in (2005)6 S.C.C. 657, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel public/statutory authorities