When this application was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of the order dated 10.7.2013 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad in C.P. Case no.2118 of 2008 whereby a petition for discharge filed under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was rejected, an objection was taken by the office over the maintainability of this application, as according to the office, a revision would lie against the impugned order.

2. Over the maintainability of the matter, heard Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing for the State.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that it is true that it has been well settled principle that an inherent power will come into play only when there is no provision in the Code for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party and that if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, it can be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the court and in that event, the High Court would refrain to interfere with the order in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But at the same time, it has also been held that none of the provisions of the Code prohibits or expressly bars invoking power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court. Particularly for securing ends of justice, interference of the High Court is absolutely necessary. In this regard it was further submitted that there has been absolutely no credence against the petitioners at the stage of Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, still the prayer for discharge has been rejected and thereby order impugned is patently illegal. In that event, there would be no bar for the High Court to examine the legality of the order in exercise of its inherent power.

4. Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to decisions rendered in cases of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another [(2009) 2 SCC 370], Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chandra and another [(2012) 9 SCC 460] as well as in a case of Madhu Limaya vs. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551] and also in a case of Amar Nath vs. State of Haryana [(1977) 4 SCC 137].

5. On account of the fact that the order under which prayer for discharge was rejected can be corrected by the Court in exercise of revisional power, an objection has been taken by the office over the maintainability of this application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is the general notion which has been well established. But at the same time, this has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases that nothing in the Code can limit or affect the exercise of inherent power by the High Court but that power should be exercised by the High Court sparingly, particularly in a situation which calls for interference to prevent abuse of the process of the court or for the ends of justice.

6. In this regard, I may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Madhu Limaya vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) whereby their Lordships after taking notice of the provision as contained in Section 397 (2) and also under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed at paragraph 10 as under:

“10. As pointed out in Amar Nath case the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of th