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2010 Supreme(Jhk) 1013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND
Rakesh Ranjan Prasad, J.
Mihir Kumar Mandol - Appellant
Vs.
Steel Authority Of India Limited And Others - Respondent
WP(S) No. 103 of 2008
Decided On : 30-06-2010
For the Appellant : S.N. Mishra and B. Mishra
For the Respondent: Ananda Sen
The date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate is conclusive proof of age, and no other records, including service records, should be considered as conclusive proof of age when the mutual relationship between employer and employee is governed by specific implementation instructions.
Headnote:
Date of Birth - Employment - The date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate is a conclusive proof of age, and no other records, including service records, should be considered as conclusive proof of age when the mutual relationship between employer and employee is governed by specific implementation instructions.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner joined as unskilled labor based on a matriculation certificate showing his date of birth as 5.7.1952. However, the employer later claimed his date of birth as 8.4.1947, leading to his premature retirement.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate was conclusive proof of the petitioner's age, and the employer's action was illegal and arbitrary.
Issues: The main issue was the discrepancy in the petitioner's recorded date of birth and the subsequent premature retirement based on a different date of birth claimed by the employer.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate is conclusive proof of age, and no other records, including service records, should be considered as conclusive proof of age when the mutual relationship between employer and employee is governed by specific implementation instructions.
Final Decision: The court quashed the order for premature retirement and allowed the petitioner to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation as per the entry in the Matriculation Certificate, with entitlement to all consequential benefits including salary for the period from the premature retirement onward.
JUDGMENT :
R.R. Prasaad, J.
Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
2. The petitioner a matriculate, on being appointed as unskilled labour, gave his joining on 8.4.1969. At the time of joining, the matriculation certificate issued in the year 1967 showing date of birth of the petitioner as 5.7.1952 was submitted before the authority and as such, the petitioner had every reason to believe that said date of birth has been entered into the service book. On that basis, same date of birth was recorded in the employees provident fund record and even in the medical book issued on 27.11.2982, age of the petitioner was recorded as 30 years which corresponds to the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate but all on a sudden to utter surprise of the petitioner, notice was issued to the petitioner on 29.7.2006 intimating therein that the petitioner has to superannuate on 30.4.2007, though as per the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate, the petitioner was supposed to retire in the year 2012 on attaining the age of superannuation, i.e.60 years and, therefore, the petitioner made a representation before the authority but no order was passed, as a result of which, the petitioner was made to retire on 30.4.2007 illegally, arbitrarily and since then he is out of job and hence, the petitioner has preferred this writ application seeking quashing of the letter dated 29.7.2006 under which the petitioner was made to retire on 30.4.2007.
3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents stating therein that at the time of joining, the petitioner on being examined medically was found to be aged about 22 years on 8.4.1969. Accordingly, the date of birth of the petitioner was recorded as 8.4.1947 in the service record and on that basis, the petitioner was made to retire and as such, action of the respondents can never be said to be illegal and arbitrary and that date of birth as claimed in 5.7.1952 can never be accepted as he being less than 18 years in the year 1969 would not have been allowed to join the service.
4. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that stand taken on behalf of the respondents is contrary to law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court rendered in a case of Kamta Pandey v. B.C.C.L (F.B) 2007 (3) JLJR 726 holding therein that date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate is conclusive proof of age and that in absence of any rule or instruction regarding one having age less than 18 years is ineligible to be appointed, the plea taken on behalf of the respondents does not have any leg to stand which view has been taken by this Court rendered in a case of Ram Das Rajak v. Steel Authority of India Limited and Ors. in W.P. (S) No. 4181 of 2008.
5. Since the factual position is almost the same as it was there in the case of Kamta Pandey v. B.C.C.L (F.B) (supra), the principle laid down by the Full Bench of this Court is applicable in this case also. I may indicate that following question fell for consideration before this Court:
“Whether the date of birth recorded in Matriculation Certificate, duly authenticated or the date of birth mentioned in any other records including the service records should be considered as the conclusive proof of the age, when mutual relationship between employer and employee is governed by the implementation instruction No. 76 of the National Coal Wage Agreement-III?”
6. Their Lordships after taking into account all the relevant facts and law did hold as follows:
“The date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate duly authenticated by the Education Board is a conclusive proof of age and no other records, including service records as both the parties are governed by implementation instruction No. 76 of national Coal Wage Agreement-III.”
7. In the instant case, there has been no dispute of the fact that the petitioner had passed Matriculation Examination before he entered
