The main legal point established in the judgment is that the disciplinary authority must adhere to the principles of natural justice and issue a show-cause notice before imposing a penalty.

JUDGMENT :

Heard learned counsel for the parties through V.C.

2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for following relief :-

(a) For quashing Memo No.364 dated 23.05.2007 issued by respondent No.4 whereby the respondent No.4 has differed from the findings of the Inquiry Officer and without issuing fresh show cause or giving further opportunity of hearing inflicted punishment of stoppage of six month yearly increment to the salary of the petitioner for the alleged act of indiscipline.

(b) For quashing of Memo No.190/Sa Sa dated 04.02.2008 issued by respondent No.3 whereby appeal preferred by the petitioner against order dated 23.05.2007 has been dismissed.

(c) For quashing of Memo NO.888/D dated 20.09.2008 issued by respondent No.2 whereby the revision preferred by the petitioner against order dated 23.05.2007 and 04.02.2008 has been dismissed.

(d) For a direction upon the respondents to provide the petitioner all consequential benefits including monetary as well as promotional benefit.

3. The relevant facts necessary for disposal of the instant writ application is that on 12.09.2006, petitioner was served with memo of charge and he was informed that an enquiry is sought to be held against this petitioner and on 06.09.2006 he was served with the charge-sheet along with relevant documents. The Inquiry Officer during enquiry proceeding has exonerated this petitioner; however the disciplinary authority has imposed punishment upon him.

4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner assisted by Mr. Arpan Mishra submits that a short question is involved in this case i.e. whether the action of the disciplinary authority is justified; who while disagreeing with the view of Inquiry Officer; who had exonerated the petitioner from the charge, did not issue any show-cause notice to the petitioner and simply after disagreeing with the report of Inquiry Officer, passed the impugned order.

He further submits that now the law in this regard is no more res-integra and it is a settled principle that disciplinary authority has every right to disagree with the finding of the Inquiry Officer but in that case he will have to issue notice to the petitioner before imposing penalty.

5. Mr. Ashok Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent-State tries to defend the impugned order and submits that when for the similar cause of action; charge against one Officer was proved and this petitioner was exonerated, was certainly illegal and that is the reason that the disciplinary authority had also recommended for enquiry against that Inquiry Officer.

He further contended that only for technical reason, the case should not be allowed and the instant writ application should be dismissed for the sole reason which has been mentioned in the impugned order itself.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed and the averments made in the respective affidavits, it appears that the Inquiry Officer in its report had exonerated the petitioner from the charges; however, the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the opinion of the Inquiry Officer, punished this petitioner.

It is true that the disciplinary authority has every right to disagree with the view of the Inquiry Officer; but the law says that before imposing penalty the delinquent must be given an opportunity to show-cause.

7. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84. Relevant part of paragraph Nos. 17 and 19 are quoted herein below:-

“17……………………… If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary a