The court emphasized that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and findings of fact reached by the tribunal cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings, unless based on erroneous evidence or perversity of finding.

ORDER :

The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 06.01.2022 passed by Learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (L) No. 6614 of 2010 whereby and whereunder the award dated 16.01.2010 passed in Reference Case No. 01 of 2002, by which the reference was answered against the petitioner, was refused to be interfered with.

2. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings in the writ petition, which require to be enumerated, are as hereunder:

The writ petitioner, namely, Dewa Singh, who claims himself to be workman, appointed on 01.04.1996 on the post of General Foreman and was assigned to do job/work personally and through workers.

It is the case of the petitioner that he was illegally terminated/superannuated w.e.f. 15.07.1999, which ultimately culminated into drawing of reference, being Reference Case No. 01 of 2002 whereby the Labour Court has negated the reference by passing award dated 16.01.2010 holding therein that the writ petitioner is not entitled for the relief in the instant reference.

The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the said award approached to this Court, invoking the power conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by preferring writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 6614 of 2010, on the ground that the status of writ petitioner comes within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1947’) as he was performing duty as General Foreman and was doing all types of work assigned to him and, further he was dismissed/retrenched at the age of 55 years contrary to the rules of the company where the age of superannuation is 60 years.

The learned Single Judge, appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of parties and considering the scope to interference with the fact finding recorded by the Tribunal, refused to interfere with the award passed by the Tribunal by dismissing the writ petition, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal.

3. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the ground that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the writ petitioner was discharging his duty with supervisory capacity but without considering that aspect of the matter the Tribunal came to the finding holding in the award that the writ petitioner is not coming under the fold of ‘workman’ as per the definition contained under Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947. The second ground upon which award has been passed against the writ petitioner is that the age of superannuation of employee was 55 years and as such considering that aspect of the matter the Tribunal has passed the award against the petitioner holding therein that the action of the management in retiring the workmen on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 55 years cannot be said to be justified, which according to learned counsel for the petitioner is contrary to the rules where the age of superannuation is 60 years.

4. According to learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioner has failed to produce any evidence so as to exclude him from exception (iv) of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 suggesting that he is workman of the management and if the Tribunal taking into consideration that aspect of the matter had answered the award against the petitioner, the same cannot be said to be unjustified. The learned Single Judge since taking into consideration that aspect of the matter has declined to interfere with the fact finding recorded by the Tribunal, which cannot be said to be improper.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge.

Admittedly, the petitioner, namely, Dewa Singh retired on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. at the age of 55 years, i.e., 15.07.1999 but according to petitioner, he ought to have retired on attaining the age of 60 years, as such dispute arose, which finally culminated into refer