The main legal point established in the judgment is that when an interim order is passed during the pendency of a main case, the party may have an alternative remedy of preferring an appeal under the relevant statutory provision.

JUDGMENT :

1. Learned counsel for the petitioners is permitted to change the seriatim of the respondent-M/s Jamshedpur General Consumer’s Central Co-operative Store Limited, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum as the respondent No.3 in the cause title of the present writ petition.

2. Let necessary correction in the cause title of the present writ petition be made by learned counsel for the petitioners in course of the day.

3. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 26.12.2019 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No.2 whereby the petitioners’ ancestor, namely, Late Hari Shankar Agarwal (second party in H.R.C. Case No. 73/2015) has been directed under Section 27 of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 2011’] to make payment of arrears of rent for the period from January, 2010 to June, 2017 amounting to Rs.1,85,400/- within a period of 15 days, failing which the defence of the second party would be struck off.

4. The main submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the application dated 02.08.2017 filed by the respondent No.3 for recovery of rent from January, 2010 was itself barred by limitation. Moreover, before the impugned order dated 26.12.2019 was passed by the respondent No.2, Late Hari Shankar Agarwal (the original second party in H.R.C. Case No. 73/2015 as well as the husband of the petitioner No.1 and the father of the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5) had died and hence the said order cannot be enforced against the heirs/legal representatives of a dead person without providing an opportunity of hearing to them.

5. Mr. Ankit Kumar, learned A.C to S.C (Mines)-I appearing on behalf of the State-respondents, submits that the said issue can be raised by the petitioners by preferring an appeal against the impugned order dated 26.12.2019 passed by the respondent No.2 and hence the present writ petition may not be entertained at this stage.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the contents of the present writ petition, it appears that the petitioners are primarily aggrieved with the order dated 26.12.2019 passed by the respondent No.2 directing the second party-Late Hari Shankar Agarwal to make payment of arrears of rent for the period from January, 2010 to June, 2017 under Section 27 of the Act, 2011. In fact, the respondent No.3 had filed the said case against Late Hari Shankar Agarwal invoking Section 19(1)(b)(d) & (e) of the Act, 2011. During pendency of the said case, the respondent No.3 filed an application on 02.08.2017 under Section 27 of the Act, 2011 for issuance of direction upon the second party to pay arrears of rent, which led to passing of the impugned order dated 26.12.2019. It would thus be evident that the said order is not the final order passed in H.R.C. Case No. 73/2015 filed by the respondent No.3, rather the same has been passed under Section 27 of the Act, 2011 during pendency of the main case. Section 21 and Section 23 of the Act, 2011 provide special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction. So far as Section 21 is concerned, the special procedure has been provided for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bonafide requirement of a landlord, who has filed suit for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in Clause (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 whereas Section 23 provides special provision where a landlord belongs to active/ex-servicemen of Defence Forces. In both the aforesaid cases, no appeal will lie against the order of the Controller to give possession of any building, provided that a revision petition may be filed in the High Court within sixty days from the date of order of eviction.

7. Since the order dated 26.12.2019 is not the final order passed in H.R.C. Case No. 73/2015, rather it is an interim order passed under Section 27 of the Act, 2011 during pendency of the said case, this Court is of the view tha