JUDGMENT :

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 30.09.2015 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition), whereby the respondent no. 4 – the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi declined either to pay compensation or to release the lands of the petitioners. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondents either to pay compensation along with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of acquisition till the date of actual payment or to release the lands in favour of the petitioners within a specified period.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order dated 30.09.2015 passed by the respondent no. 4.

3. It appears that the respondent no. 4 entertained the petitioners’ representation preferred by them in view of order dated 21.10.2013 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 410 of 2013. While considering the petitioners’ representation, the respondent no. 4 made factual observation that the lands in question were acquired in the year 1943-44 and the ancestors of the petitioners were paid compensation for the same. The said acquired land has been in possession of the Airport Authority of India (AAI) for last 72 years and the petitioners, after several years, claimed compensation on the current market rate without any basis.

4. As against this, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, according to the petitioners, the said lands were subsequently released finding the same to be surplus, as would be evident from the list of such lands prepared in the month of April, 1956 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition). Moreover, the respondent no. 4 himself was not sure as to whether the payment of compensation was actually made to the ancestors of the petitioners.

5. Be that as it may. Admittedly, the acquisition of the land of the concerned mouza was made in the year 1943-44 for the purpose of establishing an airport at Ranchi. Merely because the petitioner has annexed a copy of list of the persons whose lands were subsequently released in April, 1956, cannot be the sole basis to accept the petitioners’ contention that the concerned lands were taken out of acquisition. If that was the situation, the petitioners/their ancestors should have taken appropriate recourses in time. Though the respondent no. 4 while passing the impugned order dated 30.09.2015 was not sure as to whether the petitioners’ ancestors were paid compensation for the said land, yet after lapse of more than 70 years, it cannot be expected from the authorities to dig out the documents of a particular land acquisition proceeding so as to appropriately respond the hopelessly delayed claims of the concerned persons. Moreover, various other relevant facts are also missing in the present writ petition which indicate that the petitioners are also not certain on the factual aspect.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Dugal Kumar” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 295 has held as under:

24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant.

7. In the case of “Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan” reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under A