IMPORTANT POINT
The court established that disciplinary action under Section 14 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act requires a finding of malicious intent or knowledge of falsity, which was not present in this case.

JUDGMENT :

Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.

1. Heard the learned counsels for the parties.

2. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:

“That by way of this instant writ application the petitioner prays for an appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) for quashing the order dated 16.10.2017 passed by the Ld. Respondent no.2 whereby and whereunder has found that petitioner to have committed a major misconduct and passed an order for removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the government under rule 14 of CCS (CCA rules 1965) and the penalty was imposed upon the petitioner with immediate effect. And or

The petitioner further prays for an appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) for which the petitioner may be found entitled by your lordships and your lordships may pleased to pass any other order or orders which the petitioner may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

3. The records of the case indicate that the notices issued to the private respondent were validly served but nobody has entered an appearance on behalf of the private respondent. The arguments of the parties have been recorded in order dated 01.12.2023.

4. Arguments of the Petitioner

A. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner never made any complaint in the Committee Against Sexual Harassment (CASH). Only a complaint was lodged with the police and a copy of the same was forwarded to the Director who suo-moto referred the matter to CASH. The learned counsel has also referred to page no. 13 of I.A. No. 5183 of 2023 which is a letter dated 30.07.2014 and submits that it has been specifically mentioned therein that although no written or verbal complaint has been given by the petitioner regarding sexual harassment by the private respondent to the Administration Department, but several newspapers had reported that the complaint was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent in Kotwali Police Station. Because of the same, a recommendation was made to the sexual harassment committee of IIM Ranchi to investigate the matter and give its report to the Director, IIM Ranchi at the earliest.

B. Learned counsel further submits that when notices were issued by CASH, the petitioner had strongly objected to the constitution of the Committee in as much as she alleged that two members of the Committee had overheard the altercation between the petitioner and the private respondent. The learned counsel has referred to page no. 26 of the said interlocutory application whereby the objection was raised. The learned counsel has also submitted that in the said letter the petitioner had also stated that she was forced to state although she never wanted to do so because she had already objected to the constitution of the CASH Committee.

C. The learned counsel further submits that the CASH Committee recorded in the report that the petitioner could not substantiate the allegation made against the private respondent and also that the allegation was incorrect but the same by itself would not have called for any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner in as much as an inquiry in terms of section 14 of the Sexual Harassment of the Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act 2013 was required to be done. He has submitted that as per the 1st proviso of section 14(1), it has been made clear that mere inability to substantiate a complaint or provide adequate proof need not attract action against the complainant under section 14 for it. The learned counsel also submits that to proceed under section 14, the second proviso to section 14 (1) provides further that malicious intent on the part of the complainant shall be established after an inquiry by the procedure prescribed before any action is recommended. The learned counsel submits that no exercise in terms of the second proviso to section 14 has been undertaken. This is apparent from the fact that