Judgment. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for injunction. The subject-matter of the suit is a verandah in a building in N.S.C. Bose Road, Madras City. The first appellant Manohara Chetty, is the owner of the building. The building has a ground floor and a first floor. The first floor has four rooms and a verandah. The respondent, a book-selling firm, is a tenant of the appellant. According to the appellant, the respondent’s tenancy comprised the four rooms on the first floor, excluding the varandah. The 1st appellant came to Court and asked for an injunction against bis tenant, the respondent, because, according to him, the respondent was attempting to occupy even the first floor verandah which was not part of the tenancy in his favour.

2. The respondent resisted the suit, asserting that its tenancy comprised the whole of the first floor, and this included the verandah as well.

3. The trial Court recorded a finding that the respondents tenancy of the first floor included the verandah and hence there was no question of the respondent interfering with any one else’s possession in that portion. On this basis, the trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the appellate Court disagreed with this finding of the trial Court. The appellate Court found that only four rooms in the first floor had been let out to the respondent, and the verandah had always been retained with the owner. Notwithstanding this finding as to the subject-matter of the tenancy, the appellate Court proceeded to confirm the dismissal of the suit on another ground, namely, on the aspect of possession. On this aspect the appellate Court recorded a finding that the first appellant was not in possession of the verandah on the date of the suit. Acceding to the appellate Court, the verandah was in the possession of the respondent, as on the date of the suit, the respondent having earlier trespassed into that portion.

4. The first appellant’s case had been that he had let out the verandah to the 2nd appellant. The appellant, byt reject this case of the 1st appellant, but recorded a finding that the respondent had dispossessed the 2nd appellant from the verandah This finding was sought to be supported by reference to what the appellate Court recorded as admissions made by the first and second appel lants while giving evidence at the trial.

5. The finding which the appellate Court zhas rendered ,n the manner aforesaid, is canvassed by he appellant-landlord in this section appeal. His learned counsel, Mr. MP. Subramanian, while relying on the appellate Court’s favourable finding that the respondent had no claim on the verandah as a tenant, did not urge that that finding concluded the case in the appellant’s favour. Learned counsel was quite alive to the position that he had to dislodge the appellate Court’s finding that the verandah was in the respondent’s possession for it was vital for the appellant to establish his own possession of the verandah as on the date of the suit in order to ask for an injunction from the Court in his favour.

6. Ordinarily a finding as to possession must be regarded as a finding of fact, but even a finding of fact can be upset in second appeal on the score that there was no evidence to support it or that it was based on a misconception.

7. For recording the finding that neither the first appellant nor the second appellant was in possession of the verandah as the date of the suit, the appellate Court relied, out and out, on what it considered to be their admissions m the witness-box. Referring to the evidence of the 1st appellant the Ippellate Court observed:

“P.W.2 stated that the defendant had trespassed into the room” (verandah).

Referring to the testimony of the 2nd appellant the appellate Court said: —

“In fact, P.W.3 has admitted that he was driven out of the suit premises”.

8. The argument of Mr. Subramanian before me was that the so-called admissions, which the appellate Court has attributed to the 1st and 2nd appellants, do not amount

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