Order.- The first defendant/judgmentdebtor in O.S. No. 356 of 1963 on the file of the District Munsif, Dharapuram, is the petitioner in this revision petition. The first respondent herein is the decree-holder/plaintiff in the suit. Certain facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff obtained a decree declaring his right over the suit vacant site and for possession of the same. Both the trial Court as well as the appellate Court made it clear that the decree for declaration and possession is referable only to the vacant site and not to the superstructure, which is said to be in the nature of a bunk shop and is said to have been put up by the first defendant even prior to the institution of the suit. No relief is said to have been claimed by the first defendant in respect of this superstructure. The plaintiff levied execution of the decree in E.P. No. 155 of 1977. The first defendant filed E.A. No. 243 of 1977 praying for an order that the plaintiff is not entitled to possession of the superstructure mentioned in the decree. Obviously this is an attempt to stultify the execution of the decree for possession. The contention urged by the first defendant in the first Court as well as in the lower appellate Court is that in the absence of a decree directing the removal of the superstructure, the decree in the suit for delivery of possession of the suit site alone cannot be executed. Because this contention was not appreciated and accepted by the first Court as well as the appellate Court, the present revision petition has been preferred by the first defendant. The very same contention is being repeated before me.

2. The question for consideration in this revision is when a superstructure has been admittedly put up by the judgment-debtor prior to the institution of the suit and the decree which comes to be passed in the suit does not direct the removal of the superstructure while ordering the delivery of possession, can the execution of the decree be denied to the decree-holder.

3. The statutory principle which has got to be kept in mind is that where a Court directs by a decree or order that vacant possession of land should be given, that decree can be made effective by directing its own officer to remove the superstructures on it, and to deliver vacant possession of the property to the decree-holder. It may not be necessary to have any specific power in that behalf, and such a power is exercised in every case in Which vacant possession is ordered. The power to remove the superstructures on the land is an incidental power; necessary and ancillary to the power to deliver possession of the property. If, however, should there be any obstruction within the meaning of Order 21, rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that has not to be dealt with specifically under the said provisions. This has been recognised by Satyanaravana Rao, J., in K. Arumugham Naicker and another v. Sri Thiruvalluva Nainar Temple by its Trustees1 . Of course, the learned Judge was concerned with a case, where the relationship of landlord and tenant prevailed and the proceedings were one under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.

4. There will not be any difficulty with reference to a case where the superstructures came to be put up by the defendant either during the pendency of the suit or after the decree. In such a case, in execution of the decree for possession, the executing Court can order the removal or demolition of the construction made during the pendency of the suit or after the decree. Such was also the view expressed in Narain Singh v. Imam Din2 and that has been followed by D. S. Mathur, J., in Mohd. Ismail v. Ashiq Hussain3, suggesting appropriate directions according to the needs of particular cases.

5. Where, however, the superstructures were put up before the institution of the suit and were not ordered to be removed as a part of the mandate in the decree, the proper course in appropriate cases would be to direct the judgment-debtor to re

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