Judgment:-The only surviving point for consideration is whether the order of eviction of the Appellate Authority under Act XVIII of 1960 on the ground that the respondent landlady wants the premises for demolition and reconstruction is right. The concurrent finding of fact is that the requirement is bona fide and eviction has to be ordered on that account. The question mooted out before me is that as the eviction petition was filed by one amongst three co-owners without the requisite written permission from the other two co-owners to file the petition, the petition is rot sustainable. Secondly it is said that Ex P-5, and P-6, which are written authorities from the other two co-owners which were filed at a later stage and particularly at the stage of the cross-examination of the landlady, will not enure to the benefit of the respondent and cannot cure the defect which has set in when the petition was initially presented without such a written permission from the co-owners. It is not disputed that Ex. P-5 and P-6 do reflect permission in writing of the other two co-owners of the building. But what is contended is that such permission in writing having come at the stage of trial, it cannot have effect retrospectively and cure the technical defect in the petition as filed originally. The intendment of the Legislature in demanding the written permission of the co-owners of a building, when a petition for eviction under one or the other of the provisions of Act XVIII of 1960 is filed by a co-owner amongst them is obvious. It is to avoid any challenge by the co-owners at a later stage about the regularity of the said proceedings. There may be occasions when the co-owners might even refute the allegation made by the respondent. In such cases they would never have intended to file an eviction petition at all. In order to avoid such impasse, which cannot easily be set right, the Legislature provided for a provision such as sub-section (8) in section 10 of Act XVIII of 1960. Sub-section (8) reads as follows:-

“(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall,except with the previous written consent of the landlord, be entitled to apply for the eviction of a tenant.”

2. Whether this provision would apply to a co-owner is doubtful. I am not, however, inclined to express an opinion on it. Assuming that a co-owner, as the respondent in this case, was collecting or receiving the rents from the petitioner, as an agent of the other co-owners and also for himself, the sub-section demands that a petition for eviction under section 10 under one or the other of the accredited methods provided for therein is maintainable only if the previous written consent of the landlord is obtained for the purpose. Relying upon the word “previous” in sub-section (8), it is contended that such consent should be previous to the filing of the petition and any substitute to demonstrate such previous consent is not a compliance with the prescription in sub-section (8) of section 10. I am unable to agree. The intention appears to be that a co-owner shall not without the consent of others, file an application for eviction, and if a question arises as to whether he had obtained any such consent, which could be established in the alternative even in the course of the proceedings and before eviction, it would be ingeneous to extend the intendment of the prescription as meaning that the previous written consent should be given even before filing a petition to obtain an order for eviction. The entitlement of the owner for eviction of a tenant, referred to in sub-section (8) should be construed not literally but liberally. If, therefore, the written consent of the co-owners is obtained in the course of trial and before an order for eviction is obtained and if that written consent of the other co-owners sufficiently reflects the position that they gave the

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