Koshal, J.-By this order I shall dispose of two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, viz., Writ Petitions Nos. 746 and 889 of 1972, in each of which there is a single petitioner who challenges the acquisition of his land situated in Coimbatore town. The acquisition proceedings were initiated by a notification, dated the 15th of April, 1970 issued under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . Notices of the proposed acquisition were published in conformity with rule (1) of the rules framed by the Tamil Nadu Government under section 55 (1) of the Act, but no notice thereof was served individually on either of the petitioners and it is contended on their behalf that the acquisition proceedings are void for want of such notices which it was incumbent on the Collector to serve as per instruction (1) contained in paragraph 9 of Standing Order 90 issued by the Board of Revenue. That instruction states:

“(1) Besides publishing the notice as prescribed in rule 1 of the Appendix I, the Collector should see that individual notices are served as far as possible on every person known or believed to be interested in the land and to be acquired in the manner prescribed by sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894). In cases in which it has been impossible at the time of the issue of the notification under section 4 (1) so to describe all or any of the lands to be acquired that the persons interested therein can understand that their lands are likely to be needed for the public purpose, the individual notice should be issued as soon as the necessary details are available allowing 15 days thereafter for the presentation of objections to the acquisition.”

This instruction was considered in Easwara Pillai v. State of Tamil Nadu1, by Palaniswamy, J., who laid down the following two propositions in regard to it:

(1) The instruction has statutory force and is not merely an executive instruction in the sense that it emanates from a superior to a subordinate official.

(2) Even if it is regarded as an executive instruction it is based on the principle of natural justice that nobody shall be condemned and for that reason also it is binding on the acquisition authorities.

2. Attention of Palaniswamy, J., was drawn to Associated Equipment Services v. State of Madras2, decided by Ramakrishnan, J., and Meclec Nutriments and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v.State of Madras3, decided by Kailasam, J. (as his Lordship then was), in both of which it was held that the Act did not prescribe as an obligatory direction that notice be given for an enquiry under section 5-A thereof to particular persons individually. Each one of these cases was distinguished by Palaniswamy, J., on the ground that the instruction above extracted was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the same. As it is, learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu and the Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition, Coimbatore who are the two respondents before me, has contended that Easwara Pillai’s case4, was not correctly decided and that the instruction above extracted is neither statutory in character nor liable to be enforced in writ proceedings on the basis of principles of natural justice. Reliance ‘for this contention is placed on a Bench decision of this Court in Ghousia Begum v. Union Territory, Pondicherry5, which repeats the dictum given by Ramakrishnan, J., and Kailasam, J., in the cases above cited, although no reference therein also is made to the said instruction.

3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at some length I have begun to entertain doubts (and I say so with the utmost respect to Palaniswamy, J.) about the correctness of the decision in Easwara Pillai’s case4, although I have not formed any definite opinion in that behalf. The points raised are not free from difficulty and are of great general importance. I consider the cases before me, therefore, to be

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