Veeraswami CJ.-This appeal raises a point with reference to which the arguments are somewhat nicely balanced. The respondent, a B.Sc., graduate of the Madras University was employed between 4th July, 1970 and 18th November, 1972 as a cashier in the Kuzhithurai Branch of the appellant bank. There were intermittant breaks in the service. The last order of appointment dated 10th November, 1972 recited that the respondent was appointed with effect from that date for a period of nine days on a salary of Rs. 200 per mensem and dearness and. other allowances as applicable under the Desai Award. This followed certain terms and conditions, of which the first, two are:

“(1) The appointment is purely a temporary one for a period of 9 days but may be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the bank’s discretion;

(2) The employment, unless terminated, earlier, will automatically cease at the expiry of the period i.e., 18th November, 1972.”

There was the third condition, which prescribed that if the respondent wished, to leave the service before, he should give 14 days’ notice in writing failing which he would be held liable for a week’s pay. Curiously,the last term was that the temporary appointment would not confer on the respondent any right to claim for absorption in the bank’s permanent esta-blishment in any category. The respondent applied to have this order of appointment quashed and a direction to issued to the appellant to renew him as cashier. The ground of the respondent was that he had actually worked for 240 days, that as such he had a continuous service which qualified him for his statutory retrenchment compensation under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that since this provision was not complied with, the order limiting the period of service amounting to termination was invalid. K.N. Mudaliyar, J., who considered the petition, allowed it on the view that although there was no separate order terminating the respondent’s services, the provision in the appointment order aforesaid bringing about an automatic termination amounted to a termination and a “retrenchment.” within the meaning of the term as defined by section. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He quashed the appointment order, but said that he would forbear from giving any further direction. The bank appeals.

2. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, for the appellant-bank submits that:

(1) there is no termination in this case of the respondent’s services so as to satisfy the definition of retrenchment., and (2) in any case retrenchment could only be of surplus labour, which was not the case here.

The definition of "retrenchment" says that it means the termination by the employer of the services of a workmen for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. Three categories of termination or cessation of service are excluded from the purview of the definition such as voluntary retirement of the workman, retirement on superannuation in case the contract of employment provides for cessation of service at that stage and termination of the service of workmen on the ground of continued ill-health. Section 257 makes it a condition precedent to retrenchment of a workman that he be given a month’s notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment or in the alternative he be paid wages for the period of notice in lieu of it. There is a proviso to the effect that no such notice is necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service. One other qualifying requisite for retrenchment is that the workmen should have been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. ‘Continuous service’ has been defined too. But there is no dispute in this case that the respondent had put in such continuous service. The appellant’s stand, with reference to retrenchment as defined, is that it is not any termination that will fall within its purvie

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