JUDGMENT.— The suit, out of which this second appeal arises, was filed by the respondent for recovery of possession of the suit property. The first defendant was the tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the vacant site. The lease was long prior to 1955, the monthly rent being Rs. 20. The first defendant put up a superstructure also prior to 1955 on the site as a tenant. On 15th July, 1965 the first defendant assigned both the leasehold right and the superstructure in favour of the second defendant. The plaintiff determined the tenancy by notice dated 2nd May, 1966 and called upon the first defendant to deliver vacant possession. In the notice, the plaintiff had offered compensation of Rs. 300 to the first defendant for the superstructure put up by him. It was also claimed by the plaintiff that the site which was leased out to the first defendant was part of the plaintiff Church and that therefore, the first defendant has no right of purchase of the land itself. In reply to this notice, the first defendant stated that he sold the superstructure to the second defendant and that the second defendant would pay the future rent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sent a further notice to the effect that the first defendant had no right to assign and that the sale was not binding on the plaintiff. Thereafter, the suit was filed for recovery of vacant possession against both tenant and his assignee, the second defendant. The second defendant filed a written statement in which he claimed that, by virtue of the assignment of the leasehold right and the superstructure, he became a tenant entitled to the protection under the City Tenants Protection Act. He further contended that no notice was issued to him as required by section 11 of that Act and that therefore, the suit was not maintainable. He also contended that the plaintiff Church could not be represented by the Parish Priest and the suit was not properly instituted. The second defendant also filed an application under section 9 of the Act for purchase of the land. The written statement filed by the second defendant was adopted by the first defendant by filing a memo.

2. Both the Courts below have now held that the suit site is part of the Church itself and that therefore, the application under section 9 is not maintainable in view of the decisions of this Court of which one is Sundareswarar Devasthanam v. Marimuthu 1. The Courts below have also held that an assignee of a tenancy-right with the superstructure is not entitled to the protection of the City Tenants Protection Act as he will not be a tenant under the Act. In support of this contention, they relied on the decision of this Court in Kuppa Bai v. Rajagopal Nadar2. When the second appeal was pending the Legislature amended the definition of “tenant” in section 2 (4) by Tamil Nadu Act XXIV of 1973. “ The learned counsel for the appellants relied on this amended definition and contended that the second defendant had now become a tenant even if there was any doubt as to whether he was a tenant prior to the amendment of the definition. The first question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the assignee of a superstructure and the leasehold right could claim the benefit of the City Tenants Protection Act as a tenant. The definition of the word” tenant “ as it stood originally, ran as follows:

”‘Tenant’ means tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, and every other person deriving title from him, and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tennancy.“

This definition was substituted by Tamil Nadu Act XIII of 1960, which came into force on 27th July, 1960 and the amended definition ran as follows:

”‘Tenant’ in relation to any land:

(i) means a person liable to payment in respect of such land, under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and

(ii) includes:

(a) any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (1) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agre

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