Judgment.-The plaintiff is the appellant. He filed the suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,165 due from the respondents under two promissory notes, dated 28th April, 1951 which was for a sum of Rs. 250 and 28th June, 1951 which was for a sum of Rs. 750 and also a handloan of Rs. 150 taken on 21st August, 1951. A decree has been granted in so -far as the hand-loan is concerned, with interest thereon, amounting to Rs. 415. But, so far as the promissory notes are concerned, the suit was dismissed by the Courts below on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. In the plaint it is stated that the suit is not barred by limitation, as the defendants have acknowledged their liabilities for the amounts by their letters, dated 12th April, 1954, 9th June, 1954, 17th August, 1954, 7th June, 1957, 1st July, 1960 and 29th June, 1963. The suit itself was filed on 28th June, 1966. The Courts below held that the letters, dated 1st July, 1960 and 29th June, 1963 could not save the promissory notes from the bar of limitation, as by that time the suit was already barred, and that therefore these acknowledgments could not save the suit under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that, though these letters might not save the suit from the bar of limitation, the letter, dated 29th June, 1963, which has been marked as Exhibit A-10 in this case, and another letter, dated 24th June, 1966, which has been marked as Exhibit A-14 would amount to a fresh promise to pay and that, under section 25 (3) of the Contract Act, he was entitled to get a decree on the basis of there two letters. Exhibit A-14 had not been specifically referred to in the plaint, either as a statement of fact or as giving rise to a cause of action. Only Exhibit A-10 was referred to both in the statement of facts and in the cause of action. Exhibit A-14 only came by way of evidence at the time of the trial, and as such it is not open to the plaintiff to rely on this letter either for the purpose of section 25 (3) of the Contract Act or as saving the suit or as giving a cause of action. Exhibit A-10, which is the only relevant document, reads as follows:-

“With reference to the money due by us to you under the pronote for Rs. 250 dated 28th April, 1951 and the pronote for Rs. 1,000 dated 28th June, 1951, and our letter to you, dated 21st August, 1951, we very much regret the delay in paying the money due to you. We request you for some forbearance. We will pay you the amount due within three months.”

This letter was written by the second defendant, who is the son of the first defendant, to the plaintiff.

3. The question for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to rely on this letter as a fresh promise to pay a barred debt, and, if so, to what extent the defendants would be liable under this document. Sub-section (3) of section 25, of the Contract Act, which is relevant for our purpose, reads as follows:-

25. An agreement made, without consideration is void, unless-

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(3) it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent, generally or specially authorised in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits.

It would be seen from this section that, in order to invoke this provision, the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) it must refer to a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment, but for the law of limitation. In other words, the consideration for the promise is an identifiable debt, the recovery of which is barred by limitation; (ii) There should be a distinct promise to pay wholly or in part such a debt; (iii) The promise must be in writing and signed by the perron or his duly authorised agent. The scope of this section had also come up for consideration in some reported cases, the earliest of which is Appa Rao v. Suryaprakasa Rao1 . That was a

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